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CHAPTER ONE 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995 (Constitution of 1995) is silent on the 
issue of dealing with evidence obtained through human rights violations. The Prevention 
and Prohibition of Torture Act1 provides that  
‘any information, confession or admission obtained from a person by means of 
torture is inadmissible in evidence against that person in any proceedings’.2 
Section 14 limits its operation to evidence obtained through torture. This means that 
evidence obtained through human rights violations, other than torture is not covered by 
the Prevention and Prohibition of Torture Act. The position is different in South Africa,3 
Kenya4 and Zimbabwe,5 which have constitutional provisions on how to deal with evidence 
obtained through human rights violations.  
 
In Uganda today, evidence obtained through human rights violations is only treated with 
caution, especially if it involves involuntary confessions.6 Jurisprudence emanating from 
the courts is inconsistent on how to deal with such evidence. Since different jurisdictions 
have different ways of dealing with evidence obtained through human rights violations, a 
comparative study will assist the evaluation of the situation in Uganda.  
 
                                                          
1   Act 3 of 2012.  
2   Section 14. 
3   Section 35 (5) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996. See also Schwikkard PJ 
& Van der Merwe SE Principles of Evidence 3ed (2009) 1281, De Waal J, Currie I & Erasmus G 
The Bill of Rights Handbook 4 ed (2001) 658. 
4   Article 50 (4) of the Constitution of the Republic of Kenya, 2010. 
5   Section 70(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of Zimbabwe, 2013. 
6   Sections 25-27 of the Evidence Act Cap 6. 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
Courts are guided by three principles before admitting evidence obtained through human 
rights violations. First, courts use the reliability principle, because improperly obtained 
evidence may be as reliable as lawfully obtained evidence and may have a bearing on the 
innocence or guilt of an accused.7 Secondly, courts at times use the deterrent principle, for 
the purpose of punishing a person who obtained the evidence improperly.8 Thirdly, courts 
also follow the protective principle, whereby an accused does not suffer a disadvantage 
because of evidence obtained through human rights violations by investigators.9 
 
The researcher is not aware of any literature on evidence obtained through human rights 
violations in Uganda. Mujuzi10 gives an interesting analysis of HKSAR v Muhammad Riaz 
Khan (Khan)11 on the admissibility of evidence obtained through human rights violations in 
Hong Kong. The analysis uses a comparative study of the constitutions of Kenya,12 South 
Africa,13 Zimbabwe,14 and of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.15 He states 
that the ruling in Khan’s case is similar to the provisions in the Constitutions of South 
Africa and Kenya. 16  He hastens to add that the test was unanimously laid down by the 
Court in the Khan case. He does not consider Uganda’s position to Hong Kong nor 
                                                          
7    Zeffert DT & Paizes AP The South Africa Law of Evidence 2ed (2008) 712. See also John DT 
& Sarah JS The Internationalisation of Criminal Evidence Beyond the Common law and Civil 
Law Traditions (2012) 154. 
8    Zeffert DT & Paizes AP (2008) 712. See also John DT & Sarah JS (2012) 154. 
9    Zeffert DT & Paizes AP (2008) 712. See also John DT & Sarah JS (2012) 155. 
10   Mujuzi JD ‘The admissibility of evidence obtained as a result of violating the accused's rights: 
Analysing the test set by the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal in HKSAR v Muhammad Riaz 
Khan’ (2012) 16 International Journal of Evidence and Proof  425  426. 
11  Mujuzi JD (2012) 427. 
12   Article 50 (4) of the Constitution of the Republic of Kenya 2010.  
13  Section 35(5) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
14  Section 70(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of Zimbabwe, 2013. 
15  Article 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
16  Mujuzi JD (2012) 430. 
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discuss how courts in Uganda have grappled with this lacuna in the law. His analysis, 
however, shows that despite lack of a constitutional provision, courts may develop 
jurisprudence which serves the same purpose as a constitutional provision. 
 
Mujuzi17 analyses the issues to grapple with in implementing the Ugandan Prevention and 
Prohibition of Torture Act, and observes that under section 14, evidence obtained through 
torture is inadmissible. He argues that evidence obtained through inadmissible 
confessions may be inadmissible, and that the police have been keen to exploit this 
loophole. His study is limited to evidence obtained through torture in Uganda and does not 
cover evidence that could be obtained through other human rights violations. 
 
The common law exclusionary approach is narrow and generally limited to excluding 
confessions improperly obtained.18 Authors argue that it does not adequately deal with 
other types of evidence, such as, evidence obtained after illegal detention, evidence from 
illegal searches, autoptic evidence, evidence from interception, evidence as a result of 
handling other witnesses, and entrapments.19 Uganda uses the common law principles 
handed down in Kurumah s/o Kairu v R.20 The two principles state evidence improperly 
obtained is admissible and the court is not concerned with how it was obtained. The court 
                                                          
17  Mujuzi JD ‘Issues to grapple with in implementing the Ugandan Prevention and Prohibition of 
Torture Act’ (2012) 1 International Human Rights Law Review 382 388. 
18  Andrew LT & Susan N ‘Improperly Obtained evidence in the Commonwealth; lessons for 
England and Wales’ (2007) 11 International Journal of Evidence and Proof 75 75. Steven MP 
‘Unreal distinctions: The exclusion of improperly obtained evidence under section 24(2) of the 
Charter’ (1994)  32 Alberta Law Review 782 797, Heydon  JD ‘illegally obtained evidence’ 
(1973) 1 Criminal Law Review 603 603. 
19  Andrew LT & Susan N (2007) 75. Steven (1994) 797, Heydon (1973) 603. 
20  Kurumah s/o Kairu v R (1955) AC 197, 203; Andrew LT & Susan N (2001) 78. 
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has discretion to not to allow the admission of improperly obtained evidence if, its 
admission will operate unfairly against the accused.21 
 
1.1 THE POSITION IN UGANDA 
1.1.2 THE CONSTITUTION OF 1995 
The Constitution of Uganda 1995 (Constitution) provides that an accused has a right to a 
fair hearing.22 This right entails legal concepts like a presumption of innocence until 
proven guilty,23 and to be charged in accordance with the law.24 In addition, neither the 
accused nor a spouse can be compelled to give evidence against one’s self.25 The 
Constitution, however, lacks a directive on how to deal with evidence obtained through 
human rights violations.  
 
Article 50 of the Constitution provides for enforcement of rights and freedoms. It states; 
‘(1) Any person who claims that a fundamental or other right or freedom guaranteed 
under this Constitution has been infringed or threatened, is entitled to apply to a 
competent Court for redress which may include compensation. 
(2) Any person or organisation may bring an action against the violation of another 
person’s or group’s human rights.’ 
This Article provides for redress, for infringement of human rights by a court of competent 
jurisdiction upon application by an affected party. The Article is unclear on whether the 
exclusion of evidence obtained through human rights violations is a form of redress.  
It, however, provides for compensation as a mode of relief. 
                                                          
21 Kuruma page 203. 
22  Article 28 of the Constitution of 1995. 
23  Article 28(3)a. 
24  Article 28(7).  
25  Article 28(11). 
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1.1.3 OTHER LEGISLATION 
The Prevention and Prohibition of Torture Act provides that: 
‘any information, confession or admission obtained from a person by means of 
torture is inadmissible in evidence against that person in any proceedings.’26 
This section limits its operation to evidence obtained through torture. This means that 
evidence obtained through human rights violations other than torture is not covered by the 
Prevention and Prohibition of Torture Act. 
 
The Evidence Act27 places emphasis on admissibility of confessions, which is one form of 
evidence that is susceptible to human rights violations.28 The Act regulates the relevance 
and admissibility of evidence in courts29 and provides guidelines on recording of 
confessions.30 It provides that a confession which would otherwise be inadmissible, may 
still be admitted in evidence, if in the view of court, the impression making it inadmissible 
is removed.31 The court, therefore, exercises a discretion either to admit or not to admit 
the evidence.32 Section 25 of the Evidence Act provides that a confession which would be 
irrelevant because it was obtained through violence, force, threat, inducement or promise 
may be relevant. This is possible if the prosecution proves to the court that there was no 
violence, force, threat, inducement or promise used in obtaining the confession. Despite 
the grant of discretion to the court to rely on a confession, the Act does not lay down a rule 
on the admissibility of a confession obtained through human rights violations. 
 
                                                          
26 Section 14. 
27 Evidence Act Cap 6. 
28 Sections 23 - 27. 
29 Sections 24- 26. 
30  Section 23. 
31  Section 25. 
32  Section 25. 
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The Criminal Procedure Code Act33 makes provision for the procedure to be followed in 
criminal cases,34 and the modes of arrest and search of an accused.35 The Act is also 
silent on how to deal with evidence obtained through human rights violations, such as, 
illegal arrests and searches. The Magistrates Courts Act36 and the Trial on Indictments 
Act37 are equally silent on how to handle evidence obtained through human rights 
violations. 
 
The Regulation of Interception of Communications Act,38 allows authorised persons from 
security organisations to obtain a warrant from a designated judge to intercept 
communications.39 In instances where the holder of the warrant exceeds the bounds of the 
warrant, the Act still sanctions the admission of such evidence obtained, with due regard 
to the circumstances in which the evidence was obtained. Some of the circumstances 
include the potential effect of its admission or exclusion on issues of national security; and 
the unfairness to the accused that may be occasioned by its admission or exclusion.40 The 
literal interpretation of the Act is that where there is a violation of rights of an individual, 
the evidence may still be admitted on grounds on national security. 
 
  
                                                          
33  The Criminal Procedure Code Act Cap 116. 
34  Long title of the Criminal Procedure Code Act, Cap116. 
35  Sections 2- 27. 
36  Magistrates Courts Act Cap 16. 
37  Trial on Indictments Act Cap 23. 
38  Regulation of Interception of Communications Act 18 of 2010. 
39  Section 4. 
40  Sections 7(a)-(c). 
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1.2  CASE LAW 
The courts have in the exercise of their discretion, at times admitted evidence obtained 
through human rights violations and at times not. Courts have not been consistent in their 
decisions, though recent decisions point to the need to disallow evidence that is obtained 
in violation of the human rights of an accused. The courts have held that where a few 
irregularities in recording a confession do not occasion a miscarriage of justice, the 
confession is admitted.41 In other cases, the courts have held that a confession made after 
an accused has been in custody for more than 48 hours is inadmissible.42 A consistent 
violation of the rights of the accused persons in obtaining evidence has been held to 
constitute an unfair trial and as a result such evidence may not be admitted.43  
 
1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995 is silent on how evidence obtained 
through human rights violations should be treated. Lack of a constitutional provision 
compels judicial officers to act on their own discretion either to admit or not to admit the 
evidence. The discretion is based on the common law position where courts may 
disregard evidence if its admission shall be unfair to the accused’s trial.44 The courts’ 
application of discretion without a constitutional provision on how to deal with evidence 
obtained through human rights violations has led to inconsistencies on how to deal with 
                                                          
41  Namulodi Hassan v Uganda  unreported supreme court case no16/1997 (13 July 1998), 
Ssewankambo Francis, Kiwanuka Paul, Mutaya Muzairu v Uganda unreported supreme court 
case no 33 / 2001 (20 February 2003), Walugembe Henry, Ssali Paul Sande and Kamanzi 
Joseph v Uganda unreported  supreme court case no 39/2003 (1 November 2005). 
42  Uganda v Kalawudio Wamala unreported high court case no 442/1996 (6 November 1996). 
43   Kizza Besigye & Others v The Attorney General unreported constitutional court case no 7/2007 
(12 October 2010) pg 39; para 5 of the judgment. Uganda v Robert Sekabira and 10 others 
unreported high court case no 85/2010 (14 May 2014). Uganda v Ekungu Simon unreported 
high court case no19/ 2011 (20 July 2011), pg. 9 of the judgment. 
44  Kuruma v R (1955) AC 157. 
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this kind of evidence. The decisions show inconsistency in dealing with evidence obtained 
through human rights violations. While decisions have had the evidence admitted, other 
have not. 
 
The Constitutions of South Africa,45 Kenya46 and Zimbabwe47 provide for a way of dealing 
with such evidence. Hong Kong has case law which is consistent in dealing with evidence 
obtained through human rights violations.48 These four countries are all common law 
countries, like Uganda, and offer a basis for a comparative study. 
 
1.4 OBJECTIVES AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
The Constitution is silent on how to admit evidence obtained through human rights 
violations in Uganda, yet there is lack of consistency in dealing with such evidence. 
Although the Prevention and Prohibition of Torture Act provides that any information, 
confession or admission obtained from a person by means of torture is inadmissible in 
evidence against that person, the Act is limited to evidence obtained through torture.  
 
The decided cases indicate that jurisprudence has leaned more towards admission of 
confessions, yet there are other types of evidence which could be obtained through 
human rights violations. This includes evidence obtained through illegal searches, autoptic 
evidence and entrapments. If the problem is not resolved, the inconsistency in dealing 
with evidence obtained through human rights violations shall continue escalating. In 
                                                          
45  Section 35 (5) of the Constitution of South Africa, 1996; Schwikkard PJ & Van der Merwe SE 
(2009) 1281, De Waal J, Currie I & Erasmus G (2001) 658. 
46  Article 50 (4) of the Constitution of the Republic of Kenya. 
47  Section 70(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of Zimbabwe, 2013. 
48  The Khan case. 
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addition, the judgments lead to a strain on the administration of justice in so far as it is 
brought into disrepute. 
 
This research explores the concept of evidence obtained through human rights violations 
in courts of law. This evidence is a challenge every judicial officer has to deal with as it 
entails the need to punish the accused, while at the same time striking a balance to 
ensure that the evidence presented to the court for that purpose has been obtained in 
accordance with the required standards of investigation. 
 
This study helps in the improvement of the practice of evaluating evidence in courts, by 
providing recommendations to policy makers and judicial officers in the criminal justice 
system on how to handle evidence at the pretrial stages in order to greatly attempt to 
contain the consequences of this evidence.   
 
The objectives of this research are threefold: 
1. To establish how countries like South Africa, Canada, Kenya, Zimbabwe and Hong 
Kong deal with evidence obtained as a result of human rights violations. This is 
because all these countries, apart from Hong Kong, have constitutional provisions 
on how to handle evidence obtained through human rights violations. Hong Kong 
has case law relating to evidence obtained through human rights violations. 
2. To establish the position of international law on evidence obtained through human 
rights violations. 
3. To establish how Ugandan courts have handled evidence obtained through human 
rights violations.  
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1.5 LIMITATION OF THE RESEARCH 
The major challenge shall be obtaining cases from Uganda, because most of the cases 
are not reported. As the research is based at the University of the Western Cape, most of 
the materials for the study shall be obtained online. 
1.6 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The methodology is desktop research based on the review and analysis of literature and 
case law that are relevant to the subject of the study. The sources of the mini- thesis shall 
include statutory laws; legal literature involving textbooks and journals; and case law.  
 
1.7 THE PROPOSED STRUCTURE 
Chapter One includes the research proposal.  
Chapter Two includes the discussion of the position in international law in respect to 
evidence obtained through human rights violations; and whether it is binding on Uganda. 
The international instruments referred to will include the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights,49 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,50 the United Nations 
Convention Against Torture,51 the European Convention on Human Rights,52 and the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.53 
Chapter Three examines the position of evidence obtained through human rights 
violations in South Africa, Canada, Kenya, Zimbabwe and Hong Kong in comparison with 
Uganda. It also involves an examination of the statutory laws and decided cases in the 
selected countries. This chapter highlights the position in the selected countries because 
                                                          
49  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UNGA Res 217 A(III) (UDHR). 
50  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,999 UNTS 171. 
51  United Nations Convention Against Torture, 1465 UNTS 85. 
52  European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213 
U.N.T.S. 222. 
53  African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights,OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 
(1982). 
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the Constitutions of South Africa, Zimbabwe, Kenya and Canada have provisions on how 
to deal with evidence obtained through human rights violations. Hong Kong has developed 
case law which lays down rules on the admissibility of evidence obtained through human 
rights violations.54 In addition, these countries are all common law countries. 
Chapter Four discusses how courts have treated evidence obtained through human rights 
violations in Uganda in the light of the current statutory provisions.  
Chapter Five gives an analysis of the content of improperly obtained evidence in Uganda 
in the light of the law and how courts have decided cases in dealing with improperly 
obtained evidence.  
Chapter Six shall offer a conclusion of the findings and recommendations. 
                                                          
54  The Khan case. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
STATUS OF EVIDENCE OBTAINED THROUGH HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
2. INTRODUCTION 
This Chapter evaluates the position of international law on evidence obtained through 
human rights violations. The chapter discusses the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR),1 two regional instruments, and two United Nations instruments. The two regional 
instruments are the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter)2 and 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(ECHR).3 The two international instruments are; the United Nations Convention against 
Torture, Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (UNCAT)4 and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).5 
The evaluation of the instruments is placed on their monitoring bodies, and their 
jurisprudence and how they deal with evidence obtained through human rights violations. 
arguments are advanced for the African Charter, ECHR, UNCAT and the ICCPR which 
act as an aid in the evaluation of the instruments. Thereafter, a conclusion is provided 
under each instrument and a general conclusion at the end of the evaluation. Uganda has 
ratified the African Charter,6 the UNCAT7 and the ICCPR.8 A discussion of the UDHR is 
done first, because of its significance as a basis for the regional and international 
                                                          
1  UN Doc A/810 at 71 (1948). 
2  1520 UNTS 217. 
3  213 UNTS 222. 
4  1465 UNTS 85. 
5  999 UNTS 171. 
6  Ratified 27 March 1986. 
7  Acceded 3 November 1986. 
8  Acceded 21 June 1995. 
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instruments. Thereafter, a discussion of the regional instruments and the international 
instruments shall be made.  
2.1 THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1948 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 (UDHR)9 does not have a provision 
relating to admissibility of evidence obtained through human rights violations. It however, 
provides for rights which, if violated may have a basis for challenging the admission of 
evidence obtained in violation of these rights. Although it is not a treaty, some of its 
provisions have attained the status of customary international law.10 Some the rights that 
may be enforced, include, the right against torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment,11 right to an effective remedy,12 right to liberty and security of a person,13 and 
the right to privacy.14 Enforcement of these rights, like the right to privacy requires respect 
for the purity of the home; with permissible limitations to the right and recognition that any 
interference with the right must be reasonable and limited to the scope necessary to 
satisfy a legal purpose.15 In addition, respect of the right means a rejection of arbitrary and 
unlawful interference with privacy, respect for human dignity and leads to legally 
                                                          
9  U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). 
10   Humphrey JP ‘The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Its History, Impact and Judicial   
Character’ in Ramcharan BG (ed), Human Rights. Thirty Years after the Universal Declaration 
(1979) 21 – 37.   
11  Article 5. 
12  Article 8. 
13  Article 9. 
14  Article 12. 
15  George EE, ‘International Human Rights Law Challenges to the New International Criminal    
Court: The Search and Seizure Right to Privacy’ (2001) 26 Yale Journal of International Law 
385 383. 
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enforceable safeguards regulating the use of Police powers.16 The UDHR provides a basis 
for the African Charter, the ECHR, the UNCAT and the ICCPR.17 
2.2 THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES RIGHTS. 
2.2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The African Charter was adopted to promote and protect human and peoples' rights, to 
eradicate all forms of colonialism and to promote international cooperation.18             
Under this section, provisions of the Charter, the concluding observations and decisions of 
the African Commission are considered. First, although the African Charter lacks a 
provision on how to deal with evidence obtained through human rights violations; the 
African Commission has developed principles and guidelines on how to handle the same. 
Secondly, the principles and guidelines are not adequately reflected in the decisions of the 
African Commission. 
 
2.2.2 PROVISIONS OF THE AFRICAN CHARTER 
The African Charter provides for rights, which if violated in obtaining evidence, may create 
a ground for challenging admissibility of that evidence. These rights include, the right 
against torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment,19 security of a person,20 the right to 
a fair trial and the right of appeal to competent national organs.21 Other rights include the 
right to a presumption of innocence until proven guilty22 and the right to defence.23         
 
                                                          
16  George EE (2001) 323. 
17  Preambles to the ICCPR, UNCAT, ECHR and ACHPR. 
18  Preamble to the ACHPR. 
19  Article 5. 
20  Article 6. 
21  Article 7. 
22  Article 7 (1) b. 
23  Article 7 (1) c. 
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2.2.2 THE AFRICAN COMMISSION AND ITS JURISPRUDENCE 
The African Commission has mechanisms which may be instructive on how to deal with 
evidence obtained through human rights violations. These mechanisms include the 
Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa (the 
Principles)24  and the Guidelines and Measures for the Prevention and Prohibition of 
Torture, Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in Africa (the Robben 
Island Guidelines).25 Before discussing these mechanisms, the wording of the African 
Charter needs to be scrutinised.  
The African Charter establishes the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights 
(the African Commission)26 with a mandate to promote and protect human rights.27 In 
exercise of its mandate, the Commission may formulate and lay down, principles and rules 
aimed at solving legal problems relating to human and peoples' rights and fundamental 
freedoms upon which African governments may base their legislation.28 The African 
Commission passed a resolution establishing a working group with the mandate to 
prepare a draft of general principles and guidelines on the right to a fair trial and legal 
assistance.29 The Working Group presented its findings to the Commission and these 
were adopted as the Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal 
Assistance in Africa (The Principles).30 
                                                          
24  DOC/OS(XXX)247. 
25  Adopted by the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights at its 32nd Ordinary 
Session, on 17 to 23 October 2002. 
26  Article 30. 
27  Article 30. 
28  Article 45 (1) b. See Nsongurua JU, ‘The African Commission and Fair Trial Norms’ (2006) 6 
AHRLJ 229 305. 
29  ACHPR Resolution on the Right to Fair Trial and Legal Aid in Africa (1996) 
ACPHR/Res.41(XXVI)99. 
30   DOC/OS(XXX)247. 
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At its 11th Ordinary Session in Tunis, and aware of the inadequacies of Article 7,31 the 
African Commission passed a resolution on the Right to Recourse and a Fair Trial.32 It 
stated that an accused person had rights to an effective remedy for his or her rights which 
were violated,33 to be informed promptly of the charges against him or her34 and be 
brought to court promptly.35 In addition the accused had a right to prepare his defence in 
consultation with counsel,36 examine witnesses37 and exercise the right to an interpreter if 
one was needed.38 Although the resolution provided for fairness of a trial, it did not provide 
guidance on how to deal with evidence obtained through human rights violations. This 
created a vacuum in the jurisprudence of the African Commission and would defeat the 
attempts by the African commission to clarify the status of evidence obtained through 
human rights violations. 
 
In September 1999, the African Commission organised a seminar where the Dakar 
Declaration on the Right to a fair trial in Africa was issued.39 The Declaration 
acknowledged that the right to a fair trial is a fundamental right and its realisation is 
dependent on existence of certain situations.40  The Declaration laid down 11 practices 
that are instrumental to the enjoyment of the right to a fair trial. Among these practices 
included the practice of impunity and the failure by the state, to deal with human rights 
                                                          
31   Ouguergouz F (2006) The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. A comprehensive 
Agenda for Human Dignity and Sustainable Development in Africa 141. 
32   Document ACHR/Res.4(XI)92: Resolution on the Right to Recourse and Fair Trial(1992). 
33   At para 1. 
34   At para 2(b). 
35   At para 2(c). 
36   At para 2(e)i. 
37   At para 2(e)iii. 
38   At para 2(e)iv. 
39  Document ACHR/Res.4(XI)92. 
40  Introduction to the Dakar Declaration. 
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violations, resulting into a systematic denial of justice.41 The Declaration neither offered 
guidance required to ensure that evidence obtained through human rights violations is not 
admitted, nor elaborated on what effective redress entailed. On the basis of the 
Declaration, the African Commission passed a resolution42 to establish a working group to 
prepare a draft of general principles and Guidelines on the right to a fair trial and legal 
assistance.43  
 
2.2.2.1 The Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal 
Assistance in Africa 
The Principles44 urge State Parties to the African Charter to incorporate them into their 
domestic law and respect them. The Principles introduce four key concepts to aid the 
African Commission in dealing with evidence obtained through human rights violations.45  
The first concept is the right to an effective remedy. The Principles provide that everyone 
has a right to an effective remedy46 which includes the right to access to justice47 and 
reparation for harm suffered.48 It is immaterial whether the harm is suffered by a victim or 
an accused person. An individual can invoke a provision of the African Charter, if he can 
show that he or she has suffered harm. The state has an obligation to ensure that a 
                                                          
41 At para 7. 
42 Resolution on the right to a fair trial and legal assistance in Africa, Res AHG/222(XXXVI). 
43 At para 3. 
44 DOC/OS(XXX)247. 
45 Preamble to The Principles. 
46 Principle C(a).  
47 Principle C(a)1. 
48 Principle C(a)2. 
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person whose rights have been violated by state agents or persons acting in official 
capacity has an effective remedy by a competent judicial body.49 
The second concept elaborates on the role of prosecutors.50 It requires prosecutors not to 
present evidence to Court to be admitted, if they know or have reason to believe that it 
has been obtained through a violation of a suspect’s rights. 51 The prosecutor is, however 
supposed to use that evidence against perpetrators of the human rights violations. 52 This 
is an indication that the prosecutor should exercise his discretion to establish whether the 
evidence was obtained through a disregard of rights. Once he arrives at a decision that 
the evidence was obtained through a violation of human rights, he must perform a dual 
function. First, he must refuse to use that evidence against the suspect and secondly, he 
must use the evidence against the person who violated the rights of an individual in 
obtaining the information. In addition, scholars have argued that the prosecutor should 
only perform this dual function on only evidence obtained through torture.53 This dual role 
is extended to evidence obtained through taking undue advantage of a detained or 
imprisoned person is also precluded from being tendered in court, since it amounts to 
evidence obtained through recourse to unlawful means.54 This entails ensuring that this 
evidence is not tendered for admission. 
                                                          
49 Principle C(c)1. 
50 Principle F. 
51 Principle F (n). 
52 Principle F (n). 
53 Mujuzi JD ‘The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the Admissibility of 
evidence obtained as a result of torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment: Egyptian 
initiative for Personal Rights and Interights v Arab Republic of Egypt’ 2013 (17) International 
Journal of Evidence and Proof 284 287.  
54 Principles M(7)(d) and F(l). 
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The third concept prohibits collection of evidence through a violation of a detained 
suspect’s rights,55 and requires that states put in place mechanisms for receipt and 
investigation of complaints.56 In addition, it is a requirement that officers who subject 
suspects to torture, cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment are brought to justice.57 
Victims of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment have a right to claim compensation.58 
This principle introduces four distinct features that surround evidence obtain through 
human rights violations. First; it upholds the dignity of a human being even when his 
freedom to liberty is curtailed. As a consequence, the presumption of innocence is upheld 
at a critical point of gathering evidence during investigations. Secondly, protection of the 
principle extends from victims of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment to any person in 
detention, who is unduly taken advantage of.59 Thirdly, states are mandated to provide 
mechanisms for the receipt and investigation of complaints that involve procuring of 
evidence through human rights violations. The fourth distinct feature is the requirement by 
states to provide legislative avenues for compensation. 
The fourth concept in the Principles is the rule on how to deal with evidence obtained 
through force or coercion. It provides that  
‘Any confession or other evidence obtained by any form of coercion or force may 
not be admitted as evidence or considered as probative of any fact at trial or in 
sentencing. Any confession obtained during incommunicado detention shall be 
considered to have been obtained by coercion.’60 
                                                          
55 Principle M(7)(d)- (f). 
56 Principle M(7)(h). 
57 Principle M(7)(i). 
58 Principle M(7)(j). 
59 Principle M(7)(d). 
60 Principle N(6)(d)1. 
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This provision gives the stand of the African Commission on evidence obtained through 
human rights violations. Although from the wording of the provision, its application is 
limited to evidence obtained through coercion or force, Principle M(7) provides two 
instances where the application of the fourth concept above, may be extended. The first 
instance is the prohibition of taking undue advantage of a detained or imprisoned person 
from compelling him or her to confess, for the purpose of incriminating himself or herself 
or incriminating others.61 The second instance, where application of the fourth concept is 
extended is where a detained person is subjected to threats or methods of interrogation 
which impair his or her capacity of judgment.62 The interpretation of the four concepts 
should be interrelated and interdependent. 
2.2.2.2 Guidelines and Measures for the Prohibition and Prevention of Torture, 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in Africa (Robben 
Island Guidelines) 
Another important document is the Guidelines and Measures for the Prohibition and 
Prevention of Torture, Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in Africa 
(Robben Island Guidelines or the Guidelines).63 These are premised on the need to take 
positive steps to further the implementation of existing prohibitions on torture, cruel, 
inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment.64 
 
Paragraph 29 of the Guidelines provides safeguards against torture in pre-trial detention. 
It urges states to ensure that any statement obtained through the use of torture, cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (CIDT) shall not be admissible as 
                                                          
61 Principle M(7)(d). 
62 Principle M(7)(e). 
63 Res ACHPR Res 61 (XXXII) 02 adopted by the African  Commission at its 32nd Ordinary 
Session, on 17 to 23 October 2002. 
64 Preamble to the Guidelines. 
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evidence in any proceeding except against the persons accused of torture. This means 
that statements obtained through use of torture or CIDT should not be admitted in 
evidence. 
 
Just like the Principles, the Guidelines provide guidance on how to deal with evidence 
obtained through torture and CIDT.65 The Guidelines however, do not provide guidance on 
evidence obtained through other human rights violations. Scholars suggest that the 
Guidelines have not provided added value for the civil society which usually seeks to 
control the use of torture by the state.66 This is because the Guidelines reflect contents of 
other international instruments and as such lack the detail to make them a useful 
interpretative text to article 5 of the African Charter.67This reflection denies the Guidelines 
the necessary detail to make useful interpretative text to article 5 of the African Charter. 
However, without prejudice to the foregoing, guideline 29  states that evidence obtained 
through torture, cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment shall not be admitted except as 
against the perpetrators of the torture to bring them to justice. This provision is straight 
forward and the only requirement is proof of existence of torture, cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment. 
 
2.2.2.3 Decisions of the African Commission 
There are a number of decisions handed down by the African Commission which have a 
bearing on evidence obtained through human rights violations. This research shall focus 
on two decisions and provide an analysis of approach used by the African Commission. 
                                                          
65 Debra L & Rachel M ‘Ten years of the Robben Island Guidelines and Prevention of Torture in 
Africa: For what purpose?’  (2012) 12 AHRLJ 311 generally. 
66 Debra L & Rachel (2012) generally. 
67 Oral Statement made by the APT at the 29th Ordinary Session of the African 
     Commission; Report of East African Workshop 19-20 in Debra L & Rachel M (2012) 342. 
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The two decisions are the most notable on the admissibility of evidence obtained through 
human rights violations since the adoption of the Principles and the Guidelines. 
 
In Egyptian Initiative and another v Arab Republic of Egypt (Egyptian Initiative),68 the 
complainants alleged that agents of the State Security Intelligence subjected the victims to 
various forms of torture and ill-treatment during their detention, in order to confess before 
the state security prosecutor, for their involvement in the Taba bombings. In addition, the 
two complainants were held in incommunicado detention for period of about nine 
months.69 They claimed a violation of their rights under articles 4, 5, 7(1) (a), (c) and 26 of 
the African Charter.70 The African Commission found a violation of Articles 5 in respect to 
torture,71 Articles 7 and 26 in respect to the right to a fair trial.72 The African Commission 
decided that evidence obtained as a result of coercion or force may be inadmissible.73 
This was an indication that if the degree of coercion amounted to torture, cruel inhuman or 
degrading treatment; the trial Court was mandated to hold it is inadmissible without 
recourse to exercise of its discretion. The African Commission did not, however, draw a 
line to show what degree of coercion may be fatal to exercise of discretion to admit or not 
to admit evidence. 
Without prejudice to the foregoing, two issues were not dealt with by the African 
Commission. First, it did not address the issue of evidence obtained through use of undue 
advantage over the person in detention.74 Secondly, it did not address the issue that the 
                                                          
68  Communication no 334 of 2008. 
69 At paras 7, 104, 106 and 114 of Egyptian Initiative. 
70 At para 36. 
71 At paras 170 to 171 and 190. 
72 At para 219. 
73 At para 212. 
74 Principle M(7) d of the Principles. 
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despite the State Prosecutor’s knowledge that the Police used torture to obtain 
confessions from the complainants,75 had the confessions admitted this evidence, and did 
not bring the perpetrators of the torture to justice. The Principles require a State 
Prosecutor not to rely on evidence believed to have been obtained through recourse to 
unlawful methods.76 The prosecutor is expected to cause the perpetrators to be brought to 
justice.77 This failure by the African Commission, denied it a chance to enhance its 
jurisprudence on the duties of the State Prosecutors, where they knew that the evidence 
was obtained through torture or other illegal means and having it admitted. 
In Abdel Hadi and others v Republic of Sudan,78 the victims, Sudan nationals were 
internally displaced persons (IDPs), as a result of the armed conflict in Darfur.  On the 18th 
of May 2005, a team of police officers and soldiers entered the camp and tried to forcibly 
relocate several thousands of resident families. As a result of the scuffle, fifteen police 
officers and five IDPs were killed. The individuals were arrested and detained for nine 
months without appearance in Court or access to an advocate. During the detention, they 
were tortured by the government officers for the purpose of obtaining confessions. Upon 
their release, they lodged a complaint with the police to bring the perpetrators of the 
torture to justice. The Sudanese government ignored it and the individuals lodged a 
communication with the African Commission, claiming that their rights under Articles 1, 5, 
6 and 7 of the Charter had been violated.  The African Commission only made reference 
to the Principles and Guidance to a fair trial in respect denial of the right to habeas 
corpus.79 
                                                          
75 At para 7 of Egyptian Initiative. 
76 Principle F(l) of the principles. 
77 Principle F (l). 
78 Communication no 368 of 2009. 
79 At para 87. 
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The African Commission reiterated its principle that where the State does not take 
measures to investigate allegations brought before it inspite of being notified, it forfeits its 
prerogative to deal with it domestically.80 It found there was a violation of Article 5 
(torture),81 Article 6 (unlawful detention),82 and Article 7 (right to a fair trial and lack of 
access to counsel for nine months).83 In addition, the African Commission made reference 
to the Principles but limited itself to the suspect’s right to a lawyer.  
Without prejudice to the foregoing, the African Commission neither pronounced itself on 
the status of evidence that was obtained through torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading 
treatment nor on the status of evidence obtained after incommunicado detention. Although 
it is part of recognised international norms that evidence obtained as a result torture is 
inadmissible,84 it is pertinent to enhance this principle in decisions, whenever there is an 
opportunity. This communication also related to evidence obtained through violation of the 
right to counsel and African Commission ought to have commented on evidence obtained 
in disregard of the right to counsel. In doing so, it would offer guidance to State Parties 
with similar challenges by way of a preventive mandate. 
The African Commission failed to reiterate the mandate placed on the prosecutor where 
he or she knew or ought to have known that the evidence he or she intended to rely on 
had been obtained as a result of torture. Although the African Commission decided that 
there was a violation of Articles 1, 5, 6 and 7, it did not offer guidance to the state party in 
respect to its obligations and duties under the Principles and the Guidelines. Failure to do 
so cost the African Commission another opportunity at developing its jurisprudence. 
                                                          
80 At para 46. See Article 19 v Eritrea, Communication 275 of 2003 paras 77-78.  
81 At para 73. 
82 At para 84. 
83 At para 90. 
84 Tobias T ‘The Admissibility of Evidence Obtained by Torture under International Law’ The 
European Journal of International Law 2006 (17.2) 349 351. 
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2.2.2.4 Concluding observations 
The Concluding observations of the African Commission play a vital role in ensuring that 
evidence obtained through human rights violations is not admitted. Some of the 
recommendations made include, advising State Parties to provide an independent police 
oversight body,85 and criminalization of torture.86 Other State Parties have been advised to 
conform to the definition of torture as provided for in the UNCAT.87 The African 
Commission has, therefore, in its concluding observations to states, made attempts to 
show the areas of concern and recommendations in dealing with evidence obtained 
through human rights violations. Though the recommendations are not explicit, they by 
implication play a vital role in ensuring that evidence obtained through human rights 
violations, especially torture and CIDT is not admitted.  
2.2.3 CONCLUSION OF THE AFRICAN COMMISSION 
Although the African Charter lacks a provision on how to deal with evidence obtained 
through human rights violations, the African Commission, in exercise of its mandate has 
passed very vibrant principles aimed at improving the enjoyment of human rights in Africa. 
It has reiterated the need to adhere to these principles in concluding observations. The 
African Commission does not have any General Comments. Unfortunately the decisions 
                                                          
85 ACPHR concluding observations on consolidated 2nd to 10th Report of Tanzania, para 24 dated 
3 -21 November 2008, available at http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/43rd/conc-obs/2to10-
1992-2008/achpr43_conc_staterep2to10_tanzania_2008_eng.pdf, (accessed 20 July 2015). 
86 ACPHR concluding observations on 3 Periodic Report of Uganda, para 27, Part V, paras (e) and 
(f), dated 22 May 2009 available at http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/45th/conc-obs/uganda:-
3rd-periodic-report,-2006-2008/achpr45_conc_staterep3_uganda_2009_eng.pdf,. (accessed 20 
July 2015). 
87 1465 UNTS 85. See ACPHR concluding observations on initial periodic report of Botswana, 
2010 dated 12 – 20 May 2010, available at http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/47th/conc-
obs/1st-1966-2007/achpr47_conc_staterep1_botswana_2010_eng.pdf (accessed 20 July 
2015). See Section 7 of the Constitution of the Republic of Botswana 1997 available at 
http://www.chr.up.ac.za/undp/domestic/docs/c_Botswana.pdf (accessed 20 July 2015). 
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passed by the African Commission, about evidence obtained through human rights 
violations, offer little input to the development of the jurisprudence.  
 
While it is true that one of the greatest challenges to the African Commission is the 
implementation of its decisions88 and concluding observations, the contents of the 
decisions need to be poised and enriching on the facts in issue. This creates a sense of 
urgency on the defaulting state to implement the decision in whole or in part. Therefore, 
the greatest challenge is not just to advance human rights jurisprudence as reflected in 
the ACHPR,89 but to advance human rights jurisprudence through nuance argued 
decisions. 
 
2.3 THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL 
FREEDOMS 
2.3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR); is a regional treaty which protects 
human rights and fundamental freedoms in Europe.90 The ECHR was created in the 
aftermath of the Second World War and drew aspiration from the UDHR and the basis of 
the creation was to set a Guideline for enforcement of human rights in Europe. It was also 
created to place a mandate on State Parties to ensure that domestic law upheld human 
                                                          
88 Michelo H, African Courts and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 233 271 
available at www.kas.de/upload/auslandhomepages/namibia/ 
human_rights_in_africa/8_hansungule.pdf (accessed 15 January 2015). 
89 Pityana NB Preface in Murray R The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and 
international law (2000) vi. See Nsongurua JU ‘The African Commission and Fair Trial Norms’ 
(2006) 6 AHRLJ 229 229. 
90 213 U.N.T.S. 222. 
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rights in its enforcement.91 An analysis of the jurisprudence emanating from the ECHR in 
relation to admissibility of evidence obtained through human rights violations is done.  
 
2.3.2 PROVISION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
The ECHR provides for particular rights, whose violation could lead to challenging 
admissibility of evidence obtained through them. Some of these rights include right against 
torture,92 liberty and security of a person,93 right to a fair trial,94 right to respect for private 
and family life95 and the right to an effective remedy.96 
The ECHR establishes the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)97 with the mandate 
to pass decisions on individual or State applications alleging violations of the civil and 
political rights set out in the ECtHR.98 
The ECHR lacks a provision in regard to evidence obtained through human rights 
violations; but provides that in the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any 
criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a 
reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.99 Other 
rights include the right to be informed promptly, in a language which one understands, in 
detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him;100 and to have adequate 
                                                          
91 Rainey B, Wicks E, & Ovey C Jacobs, White & Ovey: The European Convention on Human 
Rights 5ed (2010) 1–3. 
92 Article 3 of the ECHR. 
93 Article 5. 
94 Article 6. 
95 Article 8. 
96 Article 13. 
97 Article 19. 
98 Articles 33, 34. Rainey B, Wicks E, & Ovey C  (2010) 1–3. 
99 Article 6(1) of the ECHR. 
100 Article 6(3)(a). 
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time and the facilities for the preparation of his defence.101 The accused person also has 
the right to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, to 
be given counsel freely when the interests of justice so require.102  He also has the right to 
examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and 
examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against 
him.103 The ECtHR has developed jurisprudence whereby evidence which renders a trial 
unfair shall not be admitted. The ECtHR does not limit its wording to torture, but rather 
includes all evidence that may render proceedings unfair. The ECHR expressly prohibits 
torture or inhuman or degrading treatment, or punishment, and there is no derogation from 
this right.104  In exercise of its mandate; the Court makes reference to the UNCAT105 for 
purposes of defining torture.106 
 
2.3.3 DECISIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
Three decisions of the ECtHR are examined to establish how it has dealt with evidence 
obtained through human rights violations. Three cases decided in 1996, 2006 and 2010, 
dealing with violations of both absolute and non-absolute rights shall be analyzed in 
chronological order to show the various developments in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR.  
 
In Saunders v the United Kingdom,(Saunders),107 the applicant, a director and chief 
executive of Guinness PLC (Guinness) was prosecuted for causing a substantial increase 
                                                          
101 Article 6(3)(b). 
102 Article 6(3)(c). 
103 Article 6(3)(d). 
104 Article 6. 
105 1465 UNTS 85. 
106 Jalloh v Germany, ECHR Grand Chamber Application 54810/2000 paras 48 and 105. (11 July 
2006)  
107 Chamber Application no 19187/1991. 
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in the quoted Guinness share price through an unlawful share-support operation. In the 
course of investigations, the accused was compelled by inspectors appointed by the 
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry to disclose incriminating evidence to them.108  At 
the trial, the Applicant denied any knowledge of giving of indemnities or the paying of 
success fees and that he had not been consulted on such matters.109 The prosecution 
sought to tender the interviews carried out by the investigators which revealed that he 
acknowledged knowledge of the payment of a success fee of 5 million pounds.110 On the 
basis of this evidence, the accused was convicted and sentenced to 5 years’ 
imprisonment.111 On appeal against the conviction based on admission of self- 
incriminating evidence,112 the Court of Appeal held the transcripts were admissible 
evidence.113 The accused then lodged his application with the Commission and stated that 
use of statements made by him in compliance with the legal requirement to adhere to the 
compulsory powers of the inspectors, was a violation of his right to a fair trial.  
 
The Commission held that first, the privilege against self-incrimination formed an important 
element in safeguarding individuals from oppression and coercion. Secondly, the privilege 
was linked to the principle of the presumption of innocence and should apply equally to all 
types of accused persons.114 The use of this evidence substantially impaired Mr Saunders’ 
ability to defend himself against the criminal charges he faced, thereby depriving him of a 
fair trial.115 The Commission clarified that the rationale for the right against self-
                                                          
108 At para 25. 
109 At paras 30- 31. 
110 At paras 31- 32. 
111 At paras 33-34. 
112 At para 38. 
113 At para 38. 
114 At para 65. 
115 At para 65. 
 
 
 
 
30 
 
incrimination was to ensure that the prosecution prove their case against an accused 
person without recourse to evidence obtained through methods of coercion or oppression 
in defiance of the will of the accused.116 
 
The Commission noted that the right against self-incrimination is a recognised 
international standard for a fair trial and if a legal compulsion to give evidence yields self-
incriminating evidence at the trial, it renders the trial unfair and should not be admitted. It 
held that although the right against self-incrimination was primarily concerned with 
respecting an accused person’s right to remain silent,117 the instant case involved legal 
compulsion of the accused, independent of his will to answer questions put to him by the 
inspector or risk contempt of Court and a 2- year term of imprisonment. Therefore where 
evidence arising out of the legal compulsion was used at a trial to incriminate him; it 
rendered the trial unfair.118 
 
In Jalloh v Germany (Jalloh),119 the applicant was subjected to forcible administration of 
emetics in order to obtain evidence of a drugs offence from his stomach. He applied to 
Court to find that the actions of the German Police constituted inhuman and degrading 
treatment prohibited by Article 3 of the Convention.120 He further claimed that the use of 
this illegally obtained evidence at his trial breached his right to a fair trial guaranteed by 
Article 6 of the Convention.121 The Grand Chamber held that the forcible administration of 
emetics was not evidence of torture, but inhuman and degrading treatment.122 
                                                          
116 At para 68. 
117 At para 69. 
118 At paras 75 to 76. 
119 ECHR Grand Chamber Application 54810/2000. 
120 At para 3. 
121 At para 3. 
122 At paras 78, 82 and 106. 
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In establishing whether the right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the Convention was 
infringed, by use of the medical evidence against the applicant, the ECtHR held that it is 
settled law of the Court that while Article 6 guarantees the right to a fair hearing, it did not 
lay down any rules on the admissibility of evidence as such. This was primarily a matter 
for regulation under national law.123 The Court reiterated that it was not its role to 
determine whether evidence obtained unlawfully in terms of domestic law, was admissible 
but rather, whether the proceedings as a whole, including the way in which the evidence 
was obtained, were fair.124 This was because the domestic legislation of the Federal 
Republic of Germany provided for a mode of administering the emetics, to recover the 
evidence.125 The ECtHR did not pronounce itself on whether the use of evidence obtained 
by an act qualified as inhuman and degrading treatment automatically renders a trial 
unfair.126 
The Court clarified the normal instances of self-incrimination. It distinguished between use 
of real evidence and derivative evidence obtained from an accused person in violation of 
Article 3. It noted that the privilege against self-incrimination is commonly understood in 
the Contracting States to be primarily concerned with respecting the will of the defendant 
to remain silent in the face of questioning and not to be compelled to provide a statement. 
Therefore in a case where the self-incrimination required the state to procure real 
evidence from the accused person and admit it in evidence, the mode of acquiring this 
evidence to be relied on at the trial was vital.127 The Court advanced four reasons to justify 
                                                          
123 At para 94. See Schenk v Switzerland para 45-46, (12 July 1988), Series A no. 140 and 
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124 At para 95 of Jalloh’s Case. 
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its decision that the forceful application of emetics to retrieve evidence from the accused 
person rendered the trial unfair. First, the administration of emetics was used to retrieve 
real evidence in defiance of the applicant’s will.128 Secondly, the Court contrasted the facts 
in Saunders Case and held that the degree of force used differed significantly from the 
degree of compulsion normally required to obtain the types of material like blood or hair 
samples.129 Thirdly, the materials in question like blood, hair or stool samples were a 
product of normal bodily functions and not regurgitation of evidence, with risk to the 
applicant’s health.130 Fourthly, the evidence in the present case was obtained by means of 
a procedure which violated Article 3. This decision marked a development in the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR in dealing with evidence whose admission would render the 
trial unfair and not simply because it violated Article 3 of the ECHR. 
The ECtHR also laid down rules to be followed in establishing if the degree of compulsion 
used violated a right to a fair trial. First, the nature and degree of compulsion used to 
obtain the evidence. Secondly, the weight of the public interest in the investigation and 
punishment of the offence in issue and thirdly, the existence of any relevant safeguards in 
the procedure; and the use to which any material so obtained is put.131 These rules once 
assessed, would enable the ECtHR to determine violation of the right to a fair trial. 
In conclusion, Jalloh’s case was distinguished from Saunders’ case in light of the mode of 
getting evidence. While in both cases, there was a legal compulsion to obtain evidence 
backed by domestic law, in Jalloh’s case, the compulsion involved use of force to a 
severity rendering the conduct of the Police inhuman. Secondly, Saunders’ Case 
suggested that only audible words extracted from the mouth of the suspect are 
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inadmissible provided their existence was independent of the will of the accused. By this 
yardstick, inhuman compulsion of a suspect to obtain evidence from his stomach would be 
admissible as long as its existence was independent of the will of the accused. This would 
lead to a creation of a dangerous precedent and as a result, the ECtHR stressed that in 
Jalloh’s Case, there was use of inhuman treatment and the ECtHR desire to render the 
evidence admissible would mean that the Court did not have a strong stance against 
CIDT.132 
 
In Gafgen v Germany (Gafgen),133 the victim abducted one Jakob von Metzler on. During 
the interrogation, the victim changed his story several times, including claiming to having 
been involved in the kidnapping but only as courier. Due to a fear of death to Jakob, a 
senior police officer ordered a subordinate officer to threaten Gafgen with torture, and if 
necessary to inflict it, unless he revealed Jakob’s whereabouts. After ten minutes and 
capitulation to the threat, Gafgen revealed where Jakob’s body could be found. As a 
consequence, police collected evidence in form of tyre tracks matching the tyres to 
Gafgen’s car and foot prints matching his shoes. On the way to the Police station, Gafgen 
confessed to having killed Jakob and then took the Police to a series of locations where 
some of Jakob’s clothing and other incriminating items were retrieved.134 Gafgen repeated 
these confessions in open Court during his trial and he was convicted of abduction and 
murder of Jakob and sentenced to life imprisonment.135 Gafgen applied to the ECtHR 
seeking orders that the treatment he had been subjected to, during Police interrogation 
concerning the whereabouts of Jakob constituted torture prohibited by Article 3 of the 
                                                          
132 Concurring judgment of Judge  Zupancic; page 44. 
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134 At paras 10-23. 
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Convention.  In addition, that his right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the Convention, 
comprising a right to defend himself effectively and not to incriminate himself, had been 
violated in that evidence which had been obtained in violation of Article 3 had been 
admitted at his criminal trial.136 
 
In respect to torture, the ECtHR was tasked to qualify the threats and whether they 
amounted to torture for the purposes of establishing whether they could be excluded from 
admissibility.137 The ECtHR reiterated that Article 3 of the Convention is absolute and 
makes no provision for exceptions and no derogation from it even in the event of a public 
emergency threatening the life of a nation.138 The ECtHR also stated that the nature of the 
offence allegedly committed by the applicant is irrelevant for the purposes of Article 3.139 
 
 In respect to the threats occasioned on Gafgen, and in contrasting Jalloh’s Case, the 
ECtHR held that for ill-treatment to reach the threshold of Article 3, it must attain some 
level of severity and that the assessment depends on all the circumstances of the case, 
such as the duration of the treatment, its physical or mental effects and, in some cases, 
the sex, age and state of health of the victim.140 Secondly, for treatment to be inhuman, 
there should have been premeditation and that it caused either actual bodily injury or 
intense physical and mental suffering.141 For treatment to be degrading, it had to arouse in 
                                                          
136 At para 2. 
137 At para 87. 
138 At para 87. See Selmouni v  France Grand Chamber Application no 25803/1994, para 95. See 
also  Labita v Italy Grand Chamber Application no 26772/1995, para 119. 
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its victim feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority capable of driving the victim to act against 
his will or conscience.142 In addition, for the ill-treatment to be classified as torture, it had 
to meet the definition in Article 1 of the UNCAT.143 The ECtHR noted that a threat to 
torture would merely be inhuman treatment and would require proof beyond reasonable 
doubt144 and the threat or conduct of the state should be sufficiently real and immediate, to 
constitute at least inhuman treatment.145 The Court found that the Police threatened to 
exert intolerable pain and use of a truth serum if Gafgen did not disclose the whereabouts 
of Jakob.146  The duration of the use of the real and immediate threats of deliberate and 
imminent ill-treatment on the applicant, caused him considerable fear, anguish and mental 
suffering.147 The ECtHR held this amounted to inhuman treatment and a violation of Article 
3 of the ECHR.148 
 
The ECtHR, however, held that in determining the effect of the evidence on the fairness of 
the trial, three factors had to be considered. These are, the nature of the violation and the 
extent to which evidence was obtained as a result of the violation, the causal link between 
the interrogation and the real evidence secured. The other factor was, the admission of 
this evidence at the trial.149 The ECtHR noted that there is no consensus among 
Contracting States on the exact scope of the application of the exclusionary rule.150 This 
may be taken to be a move by the ECtHR to maintain its legitimacy by avoiding causing 
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147 At paras 100-104. 
148 At para 108. 
149 At paras 170-172. 
150 At para 174. 
 
 
 
 
36 
 
offence to national legislatures.151 It would however have a negative effect in the 
development of its jurisprudence. It also noted the need to take into consideration the 
competing rights of the  accused and the victim and the interests of the state party.152 In 
examination of the factors above, the Court established that the confession obtained as a 
result of the threats against Gafgen, was not adduced in evidence notwithstanding the fact 
that the real evidence adduced at the trial was obtained as a result of the first confession 
to the Police.153 The ECtHR held further that Gafgen made a second confession in the 
course of the trial which was corroborated by the findings of fact concerning the execution 
of the crime. This included the fact that Police had been trailing him from the time he took 
the ransom from the family of Jakob.154 Therefore, the second confession, corroborated by 
the untainted real evidence formed the basis of his conviction and consequently there no 
unfairness occasioned by the admissibility of evidence obtained as a result of the threats 
occasioned on Gafgen by the Police. 
 
An analysis of this case reveals that, first; the ECtHR still maintains that evidence 
obtained through cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment may be admitted in Court if it 
thinks, its admission does not render the trial unfair. This is an indication that if an 
absolute right is subjected to relativity in admission of evidence obtained through its 
violation; other non-absolute rights may not be effective to countermand admission of 
illegally obtained evidence. So, if the ECtHR finds that the evidence does not render the 
trial unfair, it is admitted. Secondly, in instances of a conflict of rights like an absolute right 
against torture of a suspect on one hand and non-absolute right to life of a victim on 
                                                          
151 Maffei S & Sonenshein D, ‘The Cloak of the Law and Fruits Falling from the Poisonous Tree: A 
European Perspective on the Exclusionary Rule in the Gafgen Case’ (2012–13) 19 Columbia 
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another; the absolute right takes precedence. This can be viewed as the ECtHR’s 
instance on the absolute nature of the right against torture.155 Thirdly, the ECtHR 
reiterated its reluctance to establish rules of admission of evidence, whether it was real 
evidence or derivative evidence on grounds of established international standards.156 The 
ECtHR left this role to the national legislatures to determine admissibility of evidence.157 
 
Secondly, this decision widens the debate on whether evidence obtained in violation of an 
absolute right in Article 3 is automatically rejected by the ECtHR. This is because the 
moral basis for absoluteness is usually an assumption; until a legal prohibition is qualified 
to be able to generate the absolute right against torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading 
treatment.158 As a result the ECtHR requires convincing reasons to support an implied 
absolute right for purposes of rendering evidence obtained in violation of article 3 
inadmissible. It seems, that the absolute nature of the right against torture, cruel, inhuman 
and degrading treatment is against the state and not against private individuals leading to 
a conclusion that the right may be absolute in principle but relative in application. Nowak & 
McArthur offer a distinction between torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment (CIDT) 
and state that the distinction between torture and CIDT relates to personal liberty and 
outside a place of detention; CIDT is subjected to proportionality rendering it relative as 
                                                          
155 Steven G ‘Is the prohibition against Torture, Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment Really 
‘Absolute’ in International human Rights Law?’ 2015 (15) Human Rights Law Review 101 103. 
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opposed to absolute in application.159 The Committee Against Torture (CAT) notes that 
the severity of the violations does not really matter since what leads to CIDT also leads to 
torture and as such, no exceptional circumstances may be invoked as a justification for 
torture.160 
 
2.3.4. CONCLUSION ON THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
The ECtHR has gradually developed its jurisprudence on how to deal with evidence 
obtained through human rights violations. First, evidence is only rendered inadmissible if it 
renders the proceedings of an accused person unfair not because it is a violation of an 
absolute right. This is an indication that the yardstick is higher than mere reliance on non-
admission of evidence because the right that has been violated is an absolute right. 
Secondly, the Court has recognised the right against self-incrimination as an international 
standard for a fair trial and elevated it from the respect of an accused person’s right to 
remain silent to judicial scrutiny of evidence obtained as a result of a legal compulsion on 
the accused, independent of his will.  Thirdly, where the legal compulsion is coupled with 
use of force, independent of the will of the accused person, the ECtHR shall render 
evidence obtained through compulsion inadmissible.  This is because; to render the 
evidence admissible would mean Court lacks a strong stance to cruel practices used to 
obtain evidence.161 
 
In addition, evidence obtained through a violation of an absolute right like CIDT,   may still 
be admitted if its admission does not render the trial unfair. This is because the moral 
basis for absoluteness is usually an assumption; until a legal prohibition is qualified to be 
                                                          
159 Manfred N & Elizabeth M ‘The distinction between torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading 
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able to generate the absolute right against torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading 
treatment.162 Where there is a conflict of rights, the absolute right takes precedence. The 
ECtHR is still reluctant to establish rules of admission of evidence, and has always 
reiterated that this role should be for the national legislatures to determine admissibility of 
evidence.163 
 
2.4 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, 
INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT 
2.4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (UNCAT)164 entered into force on the 26th of June 1987 in 
accordance with Article 27(1). The basis of the UNCAT was to promote universal respect 
of human rights and fundamental freedoms; which formed part of the obligations of the 
State Parties to the United Nations Charter and regard to the UDHR, and the ICCPR.  
Two arguments are explored in relation to the CAT. First, the jurisprudence of the CAT in 
respect to admissibility of evidence obtained through human rights violations is limited to 
torture. Secondly, there is lack of clarity, whether the content of admissibility extends from 
torture to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.  
2.4.2 PROVISIONS OF THE UNCAT 
The United Nations Convention against Torture165 (UNCAT) creates a general obligation 
under international law not to subject anyone to torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading 
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treatment or punishment.166 This obligation has extended even to states that are not 
parties to the UNCAT.167 The UNCAT emerged as a result of the resurgence of torture 
and increased prominence that a prohibition against torture was inevitable in the 1970s.168 
This led to the adoption of the 1975 Declaration against Torture169 and the subsequent 
adoption of the UNCAT.170 
Before the adoption of the UNCAT, the UN General Assembly adopted a declaration 
condemning torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.171 The resolution, unlike 
the final UNCAT, provided explicitly that evidence obtained through torture, cruel, inhuman 
and degrading treatment may not be invoked. It, however, laid the discretion to use the 
evidence on the judicial officer or prosecutor since the wording used was ‘may’ instead of 
‘shall’. In addition, it provided for statements obtained through torture or other cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. This was a departure from the final text of 
the UNCAT, which only referred to statements obtained through torture. 
The UNCAT does not have a provision dealing with evidence obtained through human 
rights generally. It, however, has a provision dealing with statements obtained through 
torture. It provides that  
‘Each state party shall ensure that any statement which is established to have been 
made as a result of torture shall not be invoked as evidence in any proceedings 
                                                          
166  Articles 3 to 15. 
167 Rodley N & Pollard M The Treatment of Prisoners under International Law, 3ed (2009)  80. See 
also Rachel M, Elina S & Malcolm E The Optional Protocol to the UN Convention Against 
Torture, (2011) 1. 
168 Rachel M, Elina S, & Malcolm E (2011) 2. 
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except against a person accused of torture as evidence that the statement was 
made.’172 
This is an indication that the the statement is not limited to confessions only or need not 
be in writing. It may be a confession, a statement written or oral, provided it has been 
obtained through torture.  
2.4.3. THE COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE AND ITS JURISPRUDENCE 
The Committee against Torture (CAT) is established by the UNCAT173 with a mandate is 
to carry out the functions of receiving state party reports, individual and interstate 
complaints and making recommendations, and organising state visits to evaluate the state 
parties’ adherence to the UNCAT. The CAT also makes comments on reports it receives 
from State Parties to examine information relating to well-founded indications of torture in 
the territory of a state party. Its work plays an important role in defining torture and 
ensuring that states comply with the UNCAT.174 
2.4.3.1 General Comments 
In its General Comment 2,175 the CAT reminds State Parties that no exceptional 
circumstances whatsoever may be invoked as a justification for torture.176 In addition, the 
comment prohibits confession extorted by torture being admitted in evidence except 
against the torturer.177 The CAT further considers that the contents of Articles 3 to 15 are 
                                                          
172 The UNCAT, article 15. 
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not limited to torture but include ill-treatment.178 In addition, the General Comment ought 
to shed light on evidence obtained through torture of third parties, and its effect on 
evidence. Unlike the HRC, which has adopted the practice of publishing their 
interpretation of the content of human rights provisions in the form of comments on 
thematic issues, the CAT does not have many General Comments which limits its 
jurisprudence.179 
2.4.3.2 Concluding Observations 
The UNCAT also uses concluding observations to take note of the States’ adherence to 
the UNCAT and make recommendations for improvement. These recommendations are 
made on the basis of the reports submitted by State Parties to the UNCAT. It must be 
noted that the CAT has in a number of concluding observations, recommended that State 
Parties adhere to the strict enforcement of Article 15 of the UNCAT. The CAT requires that 
State Parties streamline their legislation and bring it into conformity with the UNCAT.180 
The prosecution of perpetrators of torture should not be subjected to discretion.181 State 
Parties are also urged not to place defences to torture in their domestic laws as this would 
lead to admission of evidence obtained through torture.182 In  addition, in situations where 
evidence is obtained though torture, the CAT requires that even in instances where the 
                                                          
178 At para 6. 
179 Tobias K (2009) 791. 
180 Concluding Observations on the second periodic report of Colombia of 1995; CAT/C/7/Add.1, 
paras 10 and 30, para 30 dated 23 November 1995. See Concluding Observations on the third 
periodic report of Australia of 2008, CAT/C/AUS/CO/1, para 30, dated 15 May 2008. 
181 See Concluding Observations on the second periodic report of France of 1998, 
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182 Concluding Observations on the sixth periodic report of Hong Kong of 2010, CAT/C/HKG/CO/4 
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accused person is tried in a another state, if the evidence was obtained through torture, it 
is not relied on during the trial.183 
 
In conclusion, the CAT has also insisted on the need for states to embrace the definition 
of torture as provided for in the UNCAT and to remove any defences which would 
otherwise require evidence obtained through torture to be upheld. However, without 
prejudice to the foregoing, the CAT’s work is limited to evidence obtained through torture, 
cruel inhuman and degrading treatment. Although the absolutist principle has raised 
debate on whether there is an absolute prohibition against CIDT, the CAT’s position is that 
what leads to CIDT also leads to torture and that is why Article 16 of the UNCAT is in 
place.184 
2.4.3.3 Decisions 
Three decisions of the CAT are considered. The first decision provides the cardinal stand 
of the CAT on evidence obtained through torture. The second decision evaluates the 
variance of the jurisdiction of the CAT on evidence that does not amount to torture, but 
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cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. The third decision evaluates how the CAT has 
handled communications that are based on anticipated torture.    
 
In Nouar Abdelmalek v. Algeria,185 the complainant was formerly in the Algerian army and 
in the context of widespread violence in Algeria during the 1990s, he refused, on a 
number of occasions, to participate in missions that troubled his conscience.186 Upon his 
subsequent release from the army, he attempted to flee Algeria on falsified documents. 
He was arrested and tortured for the purpose of obtaining information or confessions, and 
punishing, intimidating or coercing him for his supposed political affiliations.187 The CAT 
decided that the statement obtained through torture served as a basis for his conviction 
was a violation of Article 15.188 In addition, the CAT advised the State Party to conduct an 
investigation into the torture of the victim, bring the perpetrators to justice and report to the 
CAT within 90 days.189 This shows the CAT’s unwavering role in ensuring that evidence 
obtained through torture is not admitted. 
 
In R.A.Y. v. Morocco,190 the complainant, a dual French and Algerian citizen, ordinarily 
residing in France, was arrested in Morocco on 26 February 2012, under an International 
Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) international arrest warrant. He claimed to be a 
victim of a violation of Article 15 of the Convention by Morocco, which had authorized his 
extradition to Algeria on the basis of incriminating information that had allegedly been 
obtained under torture. The complainant also claimed that if he were to be extradited to 
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Algeria, he would be at risk of being tortured, in violation of Article 3 of the Convention.191 
The State party contested the admissibility of the communication and that the complainant 
had not provided any evidence to show that he would be tortured once extradited.192 The 
Committee stated that the communication was admissible. It however noted that the 
complainant merely stated before the Court of Cassation that he feared being subjected to 
torture in Algeria, without substantiating the allegation.193 The CAT stated that the 
allegation of a violation was vague in so far as he had not substantiated that he faced a 
personal and actual risk of being tortured if extradited to Algeria and that, accordingly, his 
extradition would not constitute a violation of Article 3 of the Covenant.194 This decision 
clearly shows that much as the CAT would hold that the consequences of an extradition 
may have a holding on a violation of Article 15, the complainant must go beyond 
speculation to an arguable case.195 
In Sergei Kirsanov v Russian Federation,196 the complainant claimed that his excessively 
long detention in inhumane conditions at the temporary confinement ward during the pre-
trial investigation of the criminal charges against him amounted to torture, which was 
perpetrated by the State to elicit a confession, in violation of Article 15 of the 
Convention.197 The Committee considered that the conditions of detention in the 
temporary confinement ward amounted to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment within 
the meaning of Article 16 of the Convention, and not torture.198 The CAT observed that 
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Articles 14 and 15 of the Convention referred only to torture in the sense of Article 1 of the 
Convention and did not cover other forms of ill-treatment.199 This principle goes against 
jurisprudence developed by the CAT in its General Comment200 where it stated that 
violation of Article 15 was not limited to torture but extended to cruel, inhuman and 
degrading treatment as well.201 It must be noted that this decision was passed in 2011, 
four years after the enactment of the General Comment. 
2.4.4 THE OPTIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE UN CONVENTION AGAINST 
TORTURE 
The Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture (OPCAT) is an international 
agreement aimed at preventing torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.202 Unlike other principal UN human rights treaties, it does not set out 
additional substantive human rights commitments; but focuses on establishing 
mechanisms to further the realization of pre-existing commitments of partner states.203 
The OPCAT has created mechanisms with the mandate to visit places of detention, by its 
external independent observers.204 The rationale of this approach is to reduce the 
magnitude of the Committee dealing with questions of proof of torture for the purpose of 
deciding on the admissibility of evidence obtained through torture. The OPCAT 
establishes the Subcommittee on the Prevention of Torture (SPT)205 to conduct the 
country visits206 and the National Preventive Mechanisms (NPMs)207 to examine the 
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treatment of persons deprived of their liberty and to make recommendation to relevant 
authorities.208 This in effect; means that the OPCAT grants a pre-emptive remedy to 
countries to minimize instances of obtaining evidence through torture through the 
preventive mechanisms in place. 
However a couple of challenges do exist which derail it from having the desired results. 
First and foremost, only 79 states are party to the Optional Protocol.209 In reference to the 
countries under research, it is only South Africa that is a signatory and has not yet ratified 
the Optional protocol.210 This is an indication that the pre-emptive measures therefore do 
not benefit the countries under study. Secondly reports of the OPCAT do not indicate 
whether there is a reduction of cases that involve cases dealing with evidence obtained 
through the violation of the right against torture. This is majorly because of the 
confidentiality used by the SPT and the state parties. This confidentiality affects the ability 
to gauge the effectiveness of the OPCAT.211 Thirdly since the SPT makes known the 
expected visits;212 this enables member states to avoid instances where they would 
consider to be in breach of their commitments to the UNCAT. Fourthly, the reports are of a 
confidential nature. This eludes a state party of public accountability for lack of 
                                                          
208 Article 19. 
209 State parties to the OPCAT available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/OPCAT/StatRatOPCAT.pdf (accessed 14 July 
2015). 
210 State parties that have ratified the OPCAT available at 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-9-                                                                                        
b&chapter=4&lang=en (accessed 14July 2015). 
211 The 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th and 8th Annual Report of the Subcommittee on Prevention of 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment available at 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/TBSearch.aspx?Lang=en&TreatyID=12&
DocTypeID=27 (accessed 14 July 2015). 
212 Article 15 of the OPCAT. 
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commitment to admission of evidence obtained through violation of the right against 
torture. 
2.4.5 CONCLUSION ON THE COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE 
In conclusion, the CAT will always ensure that evidence obtained through torture is not 
admitted. The rule lacks clarity in instances of evidence obtained through CIDT, although 
there is practice to the contrary. Although the General Comment states that the rule 
extends to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, decision seems to be at variance. 
Secondly the CAT has to ensure the victim has suffered torture in accordance with the 
definition in the UNCAT before considering whether such evidence is admissible. Thirdly, 
mere speculation by a victim that he will be subjected to torture upon extradition with 
substantiation of his claims is not enough to invoke the operation of Article 15 of the 
UNCAT.  
 
2.5 INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS. 
2.5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The ICCPR213 was adopted to give effect to the ideals of the UDHR in recognition of the 
fact that human beings have civil and political rights which may be enjoyed in adequately 
created conditions.214 The ICCPR therefore creates an obligation on State Parties to 
promote the universal respect for and observance of human rights.215 
 
Two arguments are evaluated; first that the HRC readily decides that facts violate a 
particular Article without deciding issues of admissibility of evidence. Secondly that the 
HRC only provides as exception if it is shown that there is an arbitrary denial of justice by 
                                                          
213 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR). 
214Preamble to the ICCPR, para 3. 
215At para 4. 
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the domestic courts. This section of the research analyses jurisprudence of the ICCPR 
which includes General Comments, decisions and concluding observations.   
 
2.5.2 PROVISIONS OF THE ICCPR 
The ICCPR does not have a provision on how to deal with evidence obtained through 
human rights violations. Just like the instruments discussed before, It has a number of 
provisions and mechanisms which are instructive on how to deal with evidence obtained 
through human rights violations. The ICCPR provides for the right against torture, cruel, 
inhuman and degrading punishment or treatment,216 right to liberty and security of 
person,217 the right to dignity of persons deprived of their liberty218 and the right to 
privacy.219  These rights provide a basis for challenging evidence obtained through human 
rights violations. 
 
The ICCPR provides for minimum guarantees in the course of proceedings which include 
the right to be informed promptly and in detail in a language which he understands of the 
nature and cause of the charge against him,220 to have adequate time and facilities for the 
preparation of his defence and to communicate with counsel of his own choosing,221 and 
to be tried without undue delay.222 Other guarantees include the right to defence,223 the 
                                                          
216Article 7. 
217Article 9. 
218Article 10. 
219 Article 17. 
220 Article 14(3)a.  
221 Article 14(3)b. 
222 Article 14(3)c. 
223 Article 14(3)d. 
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right to examine witnesses,224 the right to services of an interpreter225 and the right not to 
be compelled to testify against oneself or to confess to his or her guilt.226 
 
2.5.3 THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE AND ITS JURISPRUDENCE 
The Human Rights Committee (HRC) monitors the implementation of the ICCPR.227 It 
however has jurisprudence which enables it to be dynamic compared to the African 
Commission and the European Court of Human Rights. The jurisprudence includes 
decisions of the HRC, General Comments and Concluding Observations.  
 
2.5.3.1 General Comments 
The requirement to control compulsion of a person from incriminating himself, provides a 
safeguard to the right to human dignity and the right against torture. As such, the HRC in 
Its General Comments states that, evidence obtained by way of compulsion of any form is 
inadmissible.228 The HRC has also provided that evidence obtained through torture or 
other treatment contrary to Article 7 is inadmissible in Court; and has advises State 
Parties to train and instruct law enforcement officers not to apply such treatment.229 In 
addition, the HRC mandates State Parties to ensure an effective protection against ill-
treatment through effective investigation by competent authorities.230 The State Parties 
are supposed to ensure that perpetrators of this evidence are brought to justice.231 In 
                                                          
224 Article 14(3)e. 
225 Article 14(3)f. 
226 Article 14(3)g. 
227 Article 28. 
228 General Comment 13 U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (1984)  para 16. 
229 General Comment 20, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (1994) para 1.See Conte A, Davidson S & 
Burchill R Defining Civil and Political Rights (2004) 94. 
230 At para 1. 
231 General Comment 32, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/32 (2007) Part I, para 6. 
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addition, the HRC interprets the accused person’s right to adequate facilities to include 
access to documents the prosecution may intend to rely on to incriminate the accused. So 
if the evidence was obtained in violation of one’s rights, he or she has a right to access it 
to prepare for his or her defence.232  
Without prejudice to the foregoing, the HRC places the mandate on determination of 
admissibility of evidence on State Parties through their national courts and use of 
domestic legislation.233 This means that in instances where the evidence was obtained in 
violation of one’s constitutional rights, the HRC prefers that the domestic Courts evaluate 
the evidence. The HRC shares the same principle with the CAT in respect to evidence 
obtained through torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. The HRC 
mandates member state to ensure that statements or confessions obtained through 
torture are excluded from the evidence,234 unless, as stated earlier, that this evidence is 
used for bringing perpetrators of torture to justice.235 In contrast with the African 
Commission, the HRC does not place a dual duty on prosecutors to exercise their 
discretion in tendering evidence which is established to have been obtained through 
unlawful methods.236 
In addition, the HRC requires that the right to privacy237 is upheld when the state through 
its agencies is gathering information. It places emphasis on the need to conduct searches 
                                                          
232 Part IV, para 3. 
233 General Comment 32, para 39. 
234 Article 7 of the ICCPR. 
235 General Comment 32, para 41. 
236 See Principles on the Right to a fair Trial and legal assistance in Africa, DOC/OS(XXX)247; 
Principle F; see also Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors (Adopted by the Eighth United 
Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, Cuba, 
27 August to 7 September 1990).  
237 Article 17 of the ICCPR. 
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without harassment.238 If the collection of evidence requires surveillance, proper measures 
are taken to ensure it is done after a designated authority by law, has given an order.239 
In conclusion, the General Comments, as part of the jurisprudence of the HRC, have 
performed a great role in enhancing the principle that evidence obtained through human 
rights violations is not admitted. The only exception to this rule is if the evidence is being 
used against a perpetrator of torture, for purposes of bringing him to justice. The General 
Comments have, in particular, addressed the right to a fair trial, the right to privacy and the 
right to freedom from torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment. In 
addition, the HRC, has as a matter of principle, mandated the State Parties to lay down 
rules to establish admissibility of evidence and its assessment by Courts. Without 
prejudice to the foregoing, the General Comments are not instructive on how to deal with 
evidence obtained through human rights violations, against the perpetrators if it does not 
involve torture.240 Secondly they place not direct mandate on the State Prosecutors to 
deal with evidence that has been obtained through human rights violations. 
2.5.3.2 Decisions of the Human Rights Committee  
This Section shall examine four decisions of the HRC between 1997 and 2014. The views 
of the first two decisions were adopted by the General Assembly in 2007.241 The views of 
the subsequent two decisions were adopted by the General Assembly in 2012.242 These 
decisions shall be used to establish the status of the HRC in dealing with admissibility of 
evidence obtained through human rights violations. an argument is advanced that, 
                                                          
238 General Comment 16 of 1988,U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 21 (1994) paras 8-9. 
239 At para 8. See Conte A, Davidson S & Burchill R (2004)147. 
240 See notes 290- 294 above. 
241 Report of the HRC for the 75th to the 84th sessions to the General Assembly (VolumeVIII),   
CCPR/C/OP/8. 
242 Report of the HRC for the 103rd and 104th sessions to the General Assembly (Volume II) at its 
67th Session; Official Record A/67/40 (Vol. II). 
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although the HRC has been quite elaborate in General Comments, it has not followed suit 
when dealing with decisions arising out of individual communications. The reasoning of 
the HRC is examined in respect to decisions obtained through human rights violations. 
Thereafter, a concluding argument shall be given. 
In Azer Garyverdyogly Aliev v Ukraine,243 the author alleged that he had been tortured by 
the state authorities for the purpose of extracting confessions from him. He stated further, 
that as a result, the courts convicted him on the basis of the said evidence. He filed an 
individual communication stating that his rights under Articles 7 and 14 were violated. It 
must be noted that there was proof of torture since the author and his wife were not given 
anything to eat for four days in the detention.244 Secondly they were interrogated for four 
days.245 Thirdly, the Police made the author put on gas masks and prevent him from 
breathing.246 In addition, his wife was beaten until she became unconscious and 
subsequently had a miscarriage.247 This was proof that the evidence relied on at the 
hearing was tainted with these gross human rights violations and should have been 
disregarded. The HRC observed that there was a violation of Articles 7 and 14 of the 
ICCPR.248 It however, reiterated its stand that it is for Courts to evaluate facts and 
evidence and not the HRC unless there is a manifestly arbitrary denial of justice.249 The 
HRC found in general terms that there had been a violation of Articles 7 and 14 of the 
ICCPR. It opted not to deal with the issue of torture because it had not been raised by the 
author in the Court of first instance. The decision of the HRC did not adequately deal with 
                                                          
243 Communication no  781/1997. 
244 At para 2.4. 
245 At para 2.4. 
246 At para 2.4. 
247 At para 2.4. 
248 At para 6.6. 
249 At para 6.6. See General Comment 32, para 39. 
 
 
 
 
54 
 
evidence obtained through human rights violations. First, although the HRC recognises 
that inherent dignity is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,250 it did 
not show that it considers this principle in the decision. Secondly, the HRC’s omission of 
failing to establish why the allegations of torture were not handled in the Court of first 
instance created a failure to exercise their mandate above the exemplary minimum. As a 
result the decision showed a lack of use of the opportunity to develop the jurisprudence of 
the HRC. The HRC failed to offer clarity on what constitutes a manifest arbitrary denial of 
justice. 
In Teofila Casafranca de Gomez (on behalf of Richardo Ernesto Gomez Casafranca v 
Peru,251 the author stated that the victim was arrested without a valid warrant and was 
detained for 22 days instead of the mandatory maximum period of 15 days. He also stated 
that the Courts did not take into consideration the events that occurred in the pre-trial 
stages. The HRC noted that there was torture and threats of cruel and inhumane 
treatment.252 The HRC held that there was a violation of Articles 7, 9(1),(3) and 14. It is 
not enough to simply declare which Articles have been violated. The HRC ought to have 
established all the evidence that was obtained through human rights violations and make 
a value decision. It opted for the softer landing, where it could simply state which Articles 
had been violated without addressing the manifest, arbitrary denial of justice. The HRC 
failed to clarify what constitutes a manifest and arbitrary denial of justice for purposes of 
establishing when it may intervene. In addition; it noted that there was torture but it did not 
comment on the evidence obtained through torture. This is an indication that the HRC was 
willing to find a violation of a constitutional right and declare which Articles are violated. 
                                                          
250 At para 1 to the preamble to the ICCPR. 
251 Communication no 981/2001. 
252 At para 2.2. 
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The HRC should have commented on the international human rights standards of 
acceptable periods of detention of person arrested. 
In Torobekov v Kyrgyzstan,253 the author claimed his arrest, search without a warrant, pre-
trial detention and interrogation in absence of a lawyer by Kyrgyzstan authorities was a 
violation of his rights under Article 9, (1) and (3); Article 14, (1),(2), (3(b), (c), (d), (e); and 
Article 17 (1), of the ICCPR.254 The HRC observed that the complaints refer primarily to 
the appraisal of evidence adduced at the trial and that is for Courts of State Parties to 
evaluate facts and evidence in a particular case.255 The HRC reiterated its stand in the 
previous decisions. It noted that the only exception to render the complaint admissible was 
proof by the author that the evaluation by the domestic courts was done arbitrarily and 
amounted to a denial of justice,256 and that the conduct of the criminal proceedings in his 
case suffered from such defects.  The HRC noted that although the denial of counsel 
during interrogation was a violation of the author’s right to a fair trial,257 the author had to 
show how this affected the outcome of the criminal charges against him.258 The HRC did 
not give instances under which the exception would be evident. It did not draw a line 
between the fulfilled requirements for admissibility in instances concerning evaluation of 
evidence of by domestic Courts. 
 
                                                          
253 Communication no. 1547/2007. 
254 At paras 3.1 -3.2 . 
255 At para 5.4.See  Errol Simms v Jamaica communications no  541/1993, para. 6.2; Riedl-
Riedenstein. v Germany Communication no 1188/2003, para. 7.3; Bondarenko v Belarus  
Communication no. 886/1999, para. 9.3; Arenz et al. v Germany Communication no. 
1138/2002. 
256 At para 5.4. 
257 At para 5.5. 
258 At para 5.5. 
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In El Hagog Jumaa v. Libya,259 the author claimed a violation of his rights under Articles 
6,7,9,10 and 14 of the ICCPR. He was arrested and charged with premeditated murder 
and causing an epidemic by injecting 345 children with the HIV virus at the a public 
hospital in Libya.260 In the course of the interrogations, he was compelled to confess to his 
guilt after torture.261 The author claimed that the death sentence was imposed after an 
arbitrary and unfair trial by the State262 and that he was tortured during the pre-trial 
detention.263 In respect to violations of Article 14, the author stated that he was not 
informed of the charges against him for the first four months of his detention; nor was he 
assigned a lawyer until a full year after his arrest.264 He further stated that he was forced 
to testify against himself through torture; he was not assisted by a lawyer when he made 
his confession before the Prosecutor; the Court, without providing sufficient reasons, 
dismissed the expert report despite every indication that their report exonerated the author 
and his co-defendants.265 He contended that these elements including the unreasonable 
delays to conduct of the trial was a violation of Article 14 of the Covenant.266 The HRC 
stated that an accumulation of violations of the right to fair trial took place, including the 
violation of the right not to testify against oneself, the violation of the principle of equality of 
arms through unequal access to pieces of evidence and counter-expertise.267 In addition, 
the author’s right to prepare one’s own defence through the lack of access to a lawyer 
                                                          
259 Communication no. 1755/2008. 
260 At para 2.2. 
261 At para 2.3. 
262 At para 3.2. 
263 At para 3.3. 
264 At para 3.6. 
265 At para 3.6. 
266 At para 3.6 
267 At para 8.10. 
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prior to the beginning of the trial and the inability to speak to him freely collectively 
amounted to a violation of Article 14.268 
 
In contrast with the previous case, the author was able to prove that the evaluation by the 
domestic Courts was done arbitrarily and amounted to a denial of justice and as a result, 
the proceedings were greatly affected by such defects. The author also showed that 
denial of counsel during pre-trial detention affected the outcome of the criminal charges 
against him. The HRC by implication allowed the facts of the communication to act as an 
exception to the HRC’s stand on evaluation of evidence as a preserve of the domestic 
Courts. Since the facts included a violation of the non-derogable right against torture and 
the right to life, it played a great role in proving to the HRC that there was a violation of the 
right to a fair trial. Although the complainant was not prosecuted, his rights were none the 
less violated by the State Party. 
 
2.5.3.3 Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee 
The HRC requires that the actions of torture and arbitrarily deprivation of liberty of persons 
in unacknowledged places of detention is stopped.269 It recommends that the accused is 
promptly brought before a judge in conformity with Article 9 (3) of the ICCPR and that 
suspects do not access to a lawyer during the initial stages of detention.270 Furthermore, 
the HRC requires that allegations of torture and similar ill-treatment are promptly and 
thoroughly investigated by an independent body so that perpetrators are brought to 
                                                          
268 At para 8.10. 
269 Concluding Observations on the third periodic report of Uganda of 2004; para 17, 
CCPR/CO/80/UGA, dated June 30, 2004. 
270 Concluding Observations on the second periodic report of Kenya of 2005; para 17, 
CCPR/CO/83/KEN, dated 28 March 2005. 
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justice, and that complaint forms are available from a public body other than the Police.271 
The HRC also complements the work of other monitoring bodies by requiring State Parties 
to implement the recommendations. The HRC recommended that Hong Kong implements 
the recommendations of the CAT, requiring it to bring its laws to conform with the 
UNCAT.272 
 
2.5.4 CONCLUSION ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE 
In conclusion, the HRC has developed meticulous General Comments and decided a 
number of complaints. In the General Comments, it has stated that evidence obtained in 
violation of an accused persons rights should not be admitted. At the same time, the HRC 
maintains that issues of evaluation of evidence are a role of the domestic Courts, unless 
there exists an arbitrary denial of justice and the proceedings are affected as a result. It 
must be noted further that instances where the HRC has gone ahead to address matters 
of evaluation of evidence, the author has to surpass a high standard. In addition, if the 
violation includes the violation of the right against torture, the HRC will advise that the 
evidence is not admitted. This principle on evaluation of evidence should be evaluated to, 
through learning a few lessons from the ECtHR which has the mandate to render 
evidence inadmissible if it admissibility shall render the trial proceedings unfair. It would 
have a dual tool; to determine complaints on the strength of the violation and the effect of 
the evidence on the trial of an author. 
 
                                                          
271 At para 18. 
272 Concluding Observations on the third periodic report of Hong Kong of 2013; para 8, 
CCPR/C/CHN- HKG/CO/3, dated 12th and 13th March 2013. 
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2.6 CONCLUSION 
The African Commission, in exercise of its mandate has passed very vibrant principles 
and Guidelines aimed at improving the enjoyment of human rights in Africa. It has also 
attempted to enhance its jurisprudence in concluding observations. Unfortunately the 
decisions passed by the African Commission, about evidence obtained through human 
rights violations, offer little input to the development of the jurisprudence. The principles 
remain profound legislation of the African Union but with little development of the 
jurisprudence in African Commission decisions. 
The ECtHR follows a number of principles on how to deal with evidence obtained through 
human rights violations. First, evidence is only rendered inadmissible if it renders the 
proceedings of an accused person unfair regardless of the nature of the right violated. 
This is because the moral basis for absoluteness is usually an assumption; until a legal 
prohibition is qualified to be able to generate the absolute right. Secondly, the Court has 
recognised the right against self-incrimination as an international standard for a fair trial. 
Thirdly, the ECtHR is reluctant to decide on evaluation of admissible evidence and 
reiterates that this role should be for the national legislatures to determine admissibility of 
evidence. 
 
The CAT has a provision on non-admissibility of evidence obtained through torture. This is 
only a small part of evidence that may be obtained through human rights violations. There 
is a variance as to whether this evidence only relates to torture or cruel, inhuman and 
degrading treatment. In addition, before a decision is made on the non-admissibility of 
evidence obtained through torture, the facts should clearly fall within the definition of 
torture as provided for in the UNCAT.  
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The HRC’s jurisprudence shows that it depends of the effect of admission of evidence in 
relation to justice. If the justice is seen to be arbitrarily denied, then the HRC shall 
evaluate the admissibility of evidence. If the victim cannot pass this test, then admissibility 
is taken to be within the bounds of domestic Courts. Arbitrary denial of justice seems to 
only be evident if a number of Articles are violated, including the rights against torture.
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CHAPTER THREE 
STATUS OF EVIDENCE OBTAINED THROUGH HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN 
SOUTH AFRICA, CANADA, ZIMBABWE, KENYA AND HONG KONG. 
3. BACKGROUND 
Chapter two dealt with the status of evidence obtained through human rights violations in 
the context of international law. Chapter three deals with the status of this kind of evidence 
in South Africa, Canada, Kenya, Zimbabwe and Hong Kong. In evaluation of these 
countries, focus is placed on their constitutions and their position on evidence obtained 
through human rights violations.  
The discussion deals with the relevant case law, to show how the courts have interpreted 
the constitutional provisions. Hong Kong lacks a constitutional provision, and therefore 
focus is on cases handed down by courts on how to deal with impugned evidence.  
3.1 THE POSITION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
3.1.1 THE CONSTITUTION 1996 
The Constitution 1996 provides that 
‘Evidence obtained in a manner that violates any right in the bill of rights must be 
excluded if the admission of that evidence would render the trial unfair or otherwise 
be detrimental to the administration of justice’.1 
From the wording, there is a need to evaluate the manner in which evidence is obtained, 
nature of the rights and the two legs of the section. The two legs of this section are; 
fairness of the trial and administration of justice. This section presumes that the evidence 
                                                          
1 Section 35(5) of the Constitution 1996. 
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is admissible, unless it renders a trial unfair or is detrimental to the administration of 
justice.2 
The evidence should be obtained in a manner that violates any right in the bill of rights. 
The major situations include cases of pointing-out, where the accused is not informed of 
his or her rights before the pointing-outs,3 illegal searches,4 illegal surveillance,5 autoptic 
evidence,6 and evidence obtained through improper treatment of witnesses.7 Therefore, in 
instances of violation of statutory rights, the common law exclusionary rule or application 
of judicial may be used.8 The distinction between the common law exclusionary rule and 
the rule under section section 35(5) is that unlike the latter, the former applies to all cases, 
and not only criminal cases.9 Some of the rights canvassed in the bill of rights include, the 
right to freedom and security of the person,10 privacy,11 expression12 and movement, 13and 
the right to a fair trial.14 The right to a fair trial is guaranteed by the provision of pre-hearing 
safeguards by the Constitution. These safeguards include an accused’s right to be 
informed promptly of the charge against him,15 the right to remain silent16 and the 
consequences of not remaining silent.17  
                                                          
2 S v Tandwa [2007] SCA 34 (RSA) para 116. See Mthembu v S [2008]3 All SA 159 (W) para 25. 
3 Zeffert DT &Paizes AP The South Africa Law of Evidence 2ed (2008)  724 . 
4 Zeffert DT &Paizes AP The South Africa Law of Evidence 2ed (2008)  725. 
5 Zeffert DT &Paizes AP The South Africa Law of Evidence 2ed (2008)  728. 
6 Zeffert DT &Paizes AP The South Africa Law of Evidence 2ed (2008)  731. 
7 Zeffert DT &Paizes AP The South Africa Law of Evidence 2ed (2008)  736. 
8 Mthembu v S [2008]3 All SA 159 (W) para 32; 
9 Mthembu v S [2008]3 All SA 159 (W) para 32; see note 22 of the judgment. 
10 Section 12, Constitution 1996. 
11 Section 14. 
12 Section 16. 
13 Section 21. 
14 Section 35. 
15 Section 35(3)a. 
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Other guarantees are, the right not to be compelled to make a confession or admission 
that could be used in evidence against an accused,18 the right to be brought to court within 
48 hours19 and the right to be presumed innocent till proven guilty.20 Where the 
safeguards are disregarded by the investigating authority while collecting evidence, a 
violation of the constitutional rights occurs. This consequently creates an enabling 
environment for the accused person to invoke the section. 
Unfairness of the trial is one of the grounds for exclusion of evidence under the section. In 
S v Tandwa and others (Tandwa),21 the factors listed included the severity of the human 
rights violation, the degree of prejudice to the accused, the need to balance public policy 
on fighting crime, the interests of society and the need to balance the due process of the 
law against crime control. In Tandwa’s case, the court regarded the violations as sever 
because they were flagrant.22 This is an indication that where the conduct of the police is 
deliberate and flagrant, the court will be inclined not to admit the evidence because it 
would render the trial unfair to the accused person. These grounds apply to both 
unfairness of the trial and placing the administration of justice into disrepute.  
This is because, although the Court in Tandwa held that the grounds listed are relevant in 
establishing the unfairness on the trial of the accused,23 they added that what is unfair to 
the accused shall always be detrimental to the administration of justice.24 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
16 Section 35(3)h. 
17 Section 35(1)a. 
18 Section 35(b)a                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
19 Section 35(1)c. 
20 Section 35(3)h. 
21 2008 (1) SACR 613 (SCA) para 120. 
22 Tandwa, para 128. Zeffert DT &Paizes AP The South Africa Law of Evidence 2ed (2008) 741. 
23 Tandwa, para 117. 
24 At para 118. 
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Where the admission of the evidence places administration of justice into disrepute, then it 
shall not be admitted. In examining this ground, the court looks at factors like presence of 
good faith on the part of law enforcement officers. In Soci, the court was reluctant to 
uphold systematic deterences by police in disregard of constitutional rights without any 
justifications whatsoever.25 Other factors which the courts consider include, the nature and 
seriousness of the violation,26 urgency and public safety,27 availability of other alternative 
means of obtaining evidence in question28 and the deterrence or disciplinary factor to 
discourage police from using illegal methods.29 If the violation involves torture, the 
evidence is not admitted.30 
 3.1.2 INTERPRETATION BY COURTS 
The courts have dealt with the issue of the magnitude of a causal link; the connection 
between the violation of the right and the collection of evidence. It varies in degree in 
relation to the violation.  While the presence of a causal link is required for the application 
of section 35(5), it’s degree of severity is not a condition precedent to determination of 
admissibility of evidence. The court examines each case on its merits. In Tandwa, the 
Court held that there is a high degree of prejudice when there is a close causal connection 
between the rights violation and the subsequent self-incriminating acts of the accused.31 In 
                                                          
25 S v Soci 1998 2 SACR 275 (E), 297a. 
26 S v Mark 2001 (1) SACR 572 (C) , S v Naidoo and another, 1998 (1) SACR 479, Zeffert DT 
&Paizes AP The South Africa Law of Evidence 2ed (2008)   748, Schwikkard PJ & Van der 
Merwe SE Principles of Evidence 3ed (2009)  250. 
27 Schwikkard PJ & Van der Merwe SE Principles of Evidence 3ed (2009)  256. Zeffert & Paizes 
749. 
28 Zeffert DT & Paizes AP The South Africa Law of Evidence 2ed (2008)  751, Schwikkard 257, S v 
Hena 2006 (2) SACR 33 (SE). 
29 S v Mphala and another 1998 (1) SACR 388 (W). 
30 Mthembu.2008 2 SACR407 (SCA) para 32. 
31Tandwa, para 117. 
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S v Mark,32 the court held that a weak causal link between the violation and the evidence 
would not render the evidence obtained through human rights violations inadmissible. In S 
v Soci,33 the court held that that the evidence of pointing out without being informed of his 
right to counsel be excluded. The situation is only different if the case involves torture. In S 
v Mthembu,34 the court held that where torture had irredeemably stained the evidence of a 
third party, the subsequent voluntary testimony in court could not deter the fact that the 
evidence had been obtained through torture. In addition, evidence can still be excluded, 
even when a third party’s rights have been violated in the process of obtaining evidence 
against an accused.35 The principles above show that if the rigid rule on the use of the 
severity of a causal link is used, judicial integrity and the purpose of the constitutional 
directive would be compromised.  
The section is silent on whether an accused person has standing to bring an application 
under section 35(5), where the rights of a third party have been violated. The courts have 
held that an accused person can apply section 35(5), even where it’s the rights of a third 
party that have been violated in obtaining evidence that incriminates the accused.36 This 
reinforces the policy behind the enactment of the section, by ensuring that it is not only in 
instances where the accused’s right are violated that section 35(5) may be applied. A strict 
interpretation for that requirement would be inconsistent with the purpose of preventing 
exclusion of evidence obtained through human rights violations.37 
                                                          
32 S v Mark  2001 (1) SACR 572 (C). 
33 S v Soci1998 2 SACR 275 (E). 
34 S v  Mthembu 2008 2 SACR 407 (SCA). 
35 S v  Mthembu 2008 2 SACR 407 (SCA); See Gafgen vs Germany European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) Application no. 22978/05 para 74. 
36 S v  Mthembu 2008 2 SACR407 (SCA) para 27.                                                                                                                                                                       
37 Schwikkard PJ & Van der Merwe SE Principles of Evidence 3ed (2009)  219; para 1282. 
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In instances where evidence is obtained by third parties or vigilantes in violation of an 
accused’s rights, the evidence is subjected to section 35(5) before Court exercises its 
discretion to admit it. In S v Songezo Mini and 4 others (Mini),38  the Court subjected the 
evidence obtained by security officers to section 35(5) before admitting it. In instances, 
where there was a violation of the rights of the accused before evidence was obtained, the 
evidence was not admitted. In instances where the violation of the rights of the accused 
persons was after the evidence had been obtained, the evidence was admitted.39 In S v 
Hena,40 the court held that section 35(5) covers situations where the police abdicate their 
statutory duty to investigate crimes by sub-contracting it to anti-crime committees who 
gather evidence by seriously and deliberately violating the constitutional rights of an 
accused person. In S v Zuko,41 court provided four factors which may form the basis for 
not admitting such evidence. These are, lack of good faith on the part of vigilantes, non- 
justification of their conduct on public safety or emergency, the seriousness of the violation 
of the appellants’ rights to privacy, freedom and security of person and dignity and 
fourthly, the availability of lawful means to acquire the evidence. This approach enhances 
the right to a fair trial right from the pre-trial stages.  
The concept of who bears the burden of proof to establish that there has been a violation 
of rights in obtaining evidence is not clear in South Africa. While two decisions have 
varying views on the matter; a textual reading of the section requires the state to bear the 
burden.  In Director of Public Prosecutions, Transvaal v Viljeon (Viljeon)42 the Court held 
that the accused has to show a violation of his or her rights, before court makes a decision 
                                                          
38 S v Songezo Mini and 4 others unreported Case no 141178 of 2015 (30 April 2015), paras 20, 
21, 22.  
39 At paras 11, 12, 13, 16, 18 , 20 and 23. 
40 2006 2 SACR 33 (SE 40i-41b). 
41 Unreported ECD Case no CA & R159 of 2001. 
42 [2005] 2 All SA 355 (SCA). 
 
 
 
 
67 
 
on whether to admit the evidence.43 In other words, the accused should prove a violation 
of a right, as a threshold requirement to application of section 35(5). In S v Mgcina 
(Mgcina)44 the court placed the burden on the prosecution to disprove that the evidence 
had been obtained in an unconstitutional manner.45  The case of Viljeon was decided 
erroneously and cannot pass the constitutional test, while Mgcina offers a purposively 
approach to application of section 35(5). 
 
Evidence acquired as a result of entrapments46 is also relevant to this study because it 
involves violations of an accused’s rights. Some of these rights include the right to equality 
before the law,47 privacy,48  and association49  in the course of obtaining evidence. In 
Carel Christian Van De Berg and another v S (Carel),50 the Court held that evidence 
obtained through entrapment which renders a trial unfair, or is detrimental to the 
administration of justice should not be admitted. 
 
The Procedure used for the application of the exclusionary rule is a trial-within- a- trial to 
test the admissibility of evidence. The application is made before the evidence is 
admitted.51 This is done when the accused objects to the admission of a piece of 
                                                          
43 At paras 32, 33-4, 43. 
44 2007 (1) SACR 82. 
45 Page 95h-i. See S v Brown 1996 (2) SACR 49 (NC) at 73, See D Ally ‘Constitutional exclusion 
under s 35(5) of the Constitution: should an accused bear a ‘threshold burden’ of proving that 
his or her constitutional right has been infringed?’ 2010 (1) SACJ 22 22-38 generally. 
46 Section 252A Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. 
47 Section 9 of the Constitution 1996.  
48 Section 14 of the Constitution 1996, Nicholas Petrus Kotze v State,[2010] 1 All SA 220 (SCA) 
 paras 17-18. 
49 Section 18 of the Constitution 1996. 
50 Case No. A 116/2004 para 33. 
51S v Makhanya2002 (3) SA 201 (N) at 201. 
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evidence. The reason for this procedure is to ensure that the accused can testify on the 
issue concerning admissibility of the impugned evidence without exposing himself to cross 
examination as to his guilt. In S v Ntzweli,52 it was held that the lower court’s refusal to 
hold a trial-within- a- trial to determine admissibility of evidence obtained as a result of an 
illegal search amounted to a failure of justice.53 
 
3.1.3 CONCLUSION ON SOUTH AFRICA 
The Constitution 1996 provides a directive to exclude all evidence obtained in a manner 
that violates a right in the bill of rights, if its admission would render the trial unfair or 
would otherwise be detrimental to the administration of justice. Before a court exercises 
this directive, it exercises its discretion to establish if the impugned evidence would be 
unfair to the trial or would be detrimental to the administration of justice. Although it is a 
threshold requirement that there is a causal link, its degree is not a condition precedent to 
determination of admissibility of evidence and the courts examine each case on its merits.  
In instances where a third party’s right are violated in obtaining evidence, and the 
evidence is used against an accused party,  the accused has a standing before court to 
challenge that evidence. Where evidence is obtained by third parties other than the police, 
it is subjected to the test in section 35(5), before a court makes a decision on its 
admissibility.  The Procedure used for the application of the exclusionary rule is a trial-
within-a-trial to test the admissibility of evidence and the application is made before the 
evidence is admitted. 
                                                          
52 [2001] 2 All SA 184.187f-189g.See also DPP Transvaal v Vijeon, 2005 (1) SACR 505 (SCA) 
para 32. 
53 187f-189g. 
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3.2 POSITION IN CANADA 
3.2.1 THE CANADIAN CHARTER 
Canada has the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the Charter)54 which contains 
a provision which deals with evidence obtained through human rights violations. Section 
24(2) of the Canadian Charter provides that  
‘Where, in proceedings under subsection (1), a court concludes that evidence was 
obtained in a manner that infringed or denied any rights or freedoms guaranteed by 
this Charter, the evidence shall be excluded if it is established that, having regard 
to all the circumstances, the admission of it in the proceedings would bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute’. 
From the wording, there is a need to examine the manner in which evidence was 
obtained, that infringes on the rights in the charter. In addition to the above, evidence 
obtained in violation of section 24(2) of the Charter remains presumptively admissible until 
the preliquisites are fulfilled.55 The requirement to look at all the circumstances of the 
case, means that the scope of evaluation of the evidence is wider than the fairness of the 
trial as envisaged in the South African situation. 
 
  
                                                          
54 Part I of The Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B toThe Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. I1, s. 
24(2). 
55 R v Manninen [1987]1 SCR 1233 at 1241. 
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3.2.2 INTERPRETATION BY COURTS 
If the evidence brings administration of justice into disrepute, it shall not be admitted. In R 
v Grant,56 the Court held that bringing administration of justice into disrepute must be 
understood to mean the long-term sense of maintaining the integrity of, and public 
confidence in the justice system, using an objective inquiry.57 For instance, where a co- 
accused co-operated with the police to testify, the section cannot be applied. Furthermore, 
in R v Goldhart,58 through an unconstitutional search, real evidence was obtained in 
violation of the accused’s right to privacy under the charter. The Supreme Court of 
Canada (SCC), held that first, the testimony of the co accused had not been obtained in a 
manner that violated any right in the Charter; secondly there was insufficient link or casual 
connection between the infringement of his rights and the evidence obtained. The co- 
accused’s decision to co-operate with the police, plead guilty and testify against Goldhart 
was a decision taken at his own volition. As a result the court declined to apply section 
24(2) to the facts.  Other factors that the courts use to examine the evidence shall place 
the administration of justice into disrepute include the requirement of good faith on the part 
of the police59 and the seriousness of the violation.60 
 
                                                          
56 R. v. Grant, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 353. 
57 R. v. Grant, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 353 para 66-70.HauschildtJ‘Blind Faith: The Supreme Court of 
Canada, s. 24(2) and the Presumption of Good Faith Police Conduct’  (2010) 56 Criminal Law 
Quarterly 469 469. 
58 [1995] 31CRR 2d 330 (SCC). 
59 R v Therens, paras 30, 73,HauschildtJ‘Blind Faith: The Supreme Court of Canada, s. 24(2) and 
the Presumption of Good Faith Police Conduct’  (2010) 56 Criminal Law Quarterly 469 526 474, 
R v Chiomack [1980] 1 SCR 471, 49 CCC (2D) 257; R v Collins [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265. See also 
S Coughlan; ‘Good faith and the exclusion of evidence under the charter’ (1992) 11 Criminal 
Reports (4th) 304 304. 
60 HauschildtJ‘Blind Faith: The Supreme Court of Canada, s. 24(2) and the Presumption of Good 
Faith Police Conduct’  (2010) 56 Criminal Law Quarterly 469 475, R v Collins [1987] 1 S.C.R. 
265, para 35. 
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It must be noted that since the decision in Grant, the SCC directed that the factors to be 
considered while establishing exclusion of evidence under section 24(2) are as follows. 
First, the seriousness of the infringement of the Charter right by the state, secondly the 
impact of the breach on the Charter-protected interests of the accused and thirdly, 
society's interest in the adjudication of the case on its merits.61 By creating the three 
principles, the SCC placed emphasis on the seriousness of the violation rather than the 
seriousness of the offence. The SCC noted that the reliability and importance of evidence 
is not the determining factor of the exclusion of evidence, but rather, the magnitude of the 
infringement.62 Before Grant was decided, the Supreme Court had read into the section, 
the requirement for unfairness of the trial on the basis of the infringed rights.63 
 
Canadian courts, do not require the presence of a causal link to justify the application of 
section 24(2) of the Charter.64 The reason advanced is that the causal connection is too 
narrow and difficult to apply and therefore, its existence is not determinative. This was a 
departure from the earlier position of the courts that required the presence of a causal 
link.65 This position was subsequently confirmed in R v Brydges,66 where the Court held 
                                                          
61 R. v. Grant, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 353 paras 71-72, 76-77, 79, 86 and 127.See also Dawe J & 
McArthur H ‘Charter Detention and the Exclusion of Evidence after Grant, Harrison and Suberu’ 
(2010) 56 Criminal Law Quarterly 381 411. 
62 Stuart D ‘Welcome flexibility and better criteria from the Supreme Court of Canada for exclusion 
of evidence obtained in violation of the Canadian Charter of rights and freedoms’ (2010)16 
South Western Journal of International Law 313 324. 
63  Santoro DC ‘The Unprincipled Use of Originalism and Section 24(2) of the Charter’ (2007) 45 
Alberta Law Review 1 1. 
64 R v Strachan [1988] 2 S.C.R. 980,1005-6.  
65R v Therens [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613, 649, R v Upton [1988] 1 S.C.R. 1083. 
66R v Brydges [1990] 1 S.C.R. 190. 
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that section 24(2) would be used as long as a charter violation occurred in the course of 
obtaining the evidence.67 
 
Just like South African courts, the Canadian courts do not encourage use of vigilante 
evidence. The courts do subject the evidence to the application of section 24(2) of the 
Charter before it is admitted.68 
An applicant, who seeks to exclude evidence, bears the burden of persuading court on a 
balance of probabilities that his or her rights have been infringed.69 He must also show 
that there is an adequate relationship between the charter violation and evidence he 
wants to exclude. Before Stracham was decided, the applicant only bore the burden of 
persuading court that there was a violation in the course of obtaining evidence. In Bartle,70 
courts required the need to use a generous approach and take into consideration the 
evidence as part of an entire chain of events involving the charter breach.71 Courts later 
recognised that although the burden of proof was on the accused to prove his assertion, 
the state was better placed to disprove the breach because of its superior knowledge of 
the circumstances surrounding the way the evidence was obtained.72 
 
The Charter does not provide for the procedure to be followed in applying for exclusion of 
evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter. Case law has, however, provided for a 
systematic mode of invoking the section. From the wording of the section, the remedy 
                                                          
67 Page 210. 
68 R v Bulhay [2003] 1 SCR 206. See also R V Harrer [1995] 3 SCR 562, R v White [1999]2 SCR  
417 
69 R v Collins [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265, 277 R v Cobham 33 CR (4th) 75 at 81. 
70 R v Bartle 33 C.R (4th) 1, 31; Collins, 16. 
71 See R v Schmautz (1990) 1 SCR398, R v Harper [1994] 3 SCR 343. 
72 R v Bulingham [1995] 2 SCR 206, 234-5. 
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under section 24(2) only arises when one is proceeding under section 24(1). While section 
24(1) empowers one to apply to a court of competent jurisdiction for redress, it directs the 
exclusion of  evidence if it finds that the evidence was obtained in a manner that infringes 
or denies charter rights.73 
3.2.3. CONCLUSION ON CANADA 
The Canadian application of the exclusionary rule in the charter has undergone three 
stages. The first stage was use of the literal interpretation of the section. This was 
followed by a reading into the section of the fairness of the trial concept.74 The third stage 
started after the SCC revised the interpretation of the section in Grant.75 
The courts hold that the causal link is not determinative of the application and it’s only 
where a victim’s rights have been infringed that section 24(2) may be applied. 
 
3.3 POSITION IN KENYA 
3.3.1  THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF KENYA 2010 
Kenya, like South Africa, Canada and Zimbabwe,76 has a provision in its constitution 
(Constitution 2010) relating to evidence obtained through human rights violations. Kenya 
has ratified to the ICCPR,77 UNCAT78 and ACHPR,79 an indication that it recognises the 
authority of the decisions of the monitoring bodies. 
                                                          
73 R. v. Hynes, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 623, at para. 15.  
74 R. v. Grant, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 353 paras 71-72, 76-77, 79, 86 and 127. 
75 R. v. Grant, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 353 paras 71-72, 76-77, 79, 86 and 127. 
76 As shall be discussed shortly. 
77 Ratified 1 May 1972. Available at http://www.claiminghumanrights.org/kenya.html (accessed 21 
September 2015). 
78 Ratified 21 February 1997.Available at 
http://www.claiminghumanrights.org/kenya.html(accessed 21 September 2015). 
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The Constitution 2010 provides that   
‘Evidence obtained in a manner that violates any right or 
fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights shall be excluded if the 
admission of that evidence would render the trial unfair, or would 
otherwise be detrimental to the administration of justice.’80 
The text of the Article is quite similar to section 35(5) of the South African Constitution 
1996. The first point of inquiry is to establish what kind of evidence is referred to. The law 
regulating admissibility and relevance of evidence in Kenya is the Evidence Act,81 which 
prohibits the admission in evidence of any statement obtained through threat where the 
accused make such a statement or confession ‘to avoid any evil of a temporal nature.’82 It 
must be noted that Article 50(4) does not envisage a complete bar to admission of the 
evidence and it is left to the discretion of the courts to suppress it if its admission would 
render the trial unfair or detrimental to the administration of justice.83 
It is important to examine the context of Article 50(4) of the Constitution 2010.This portion 
of the Article is under the right to a fair trial of an accused person. The Article provides for 
the components of an accused person’s right to a fair trial which include the right against 
self-incrimination,84 the right to be presumed innocent,85 and the right to counsel.86 This is 
an indication that Article 50(4) is an extension of the accused person’s right to a fair trial 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
79 Ratified 21 January 1992, available at http://www.achpr.org/instruments/achpr/ratification/. 
(accessed 21 September 2015). 
80 Article 50 (4) of the Constitution 2010. 
81 Cap 80 Laws of Kenya. 
82 Section 26; See Mujuzi JD ‘The Constitution in practice: An Appraisal of the Kenyan Case law 
on the right to a fair trial’ 2008 (2) Malawi Law Journal 135 150. 
83 Kiage P Essentials of Criminal Procedure in Kenya  (2010) 26. 
84 The Constitution 2010, Article 50 (2)l. 
85 Article 50(2)a. 
86 Article 50(2) g-h. 
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and provides a safeguard to an accused person’s right to a fair trial. This is because the 
tenets of the right to a fair trial include the right against self -incrimination, right to legal 
representation and the right to freedom from torture in so far as the torture is inflicted for 
purposes of compelling one to confess to commission of an offence.87 
The person seeking to rely on the Article must prove to court that the evidence has been 
obtained in a manner that violates a right or fundamental freedom in the Constitution.88 If 
the manner in which the evidence has been got does not violate any right in the 
constitution, then an accused person cannot benefit from the redress in Article 50(4).   
The evidence shall be excluded upon the prospect of given events. The wording of the 
Article connotes that it is mandatory to exclude it. Unlike South Africa which says it must 
be excluded, the Kenyan Constitution states that it shall be excluded. Case law seems to 
suggest that must and shall carry the same meaning. It is suffice to note that there is a 
mandate no to admit the evidence. 
The Article is silent on who has locus to apply to court to invoke the operation of Article 
50(4) of the Constitution. Since the context of the Article deals with the rights to a fair trial, 
it is prudent to hold the view that it is an accused person who has the locus to seek the 
operation of the Article. 
 
Fourthly, the evidence shall be excluded upon application of a dual test; if it renders the 
trial unfair or is detrimental to the administration of justice. Just like South Africa, the duo 
test is applied before the mandatory directive is applied. A discussion on how the courts 
have dealt with this kind of evidence.shallbe dealt with in due course. 
 
                                                          
87 Mujuzi JD ‘The Constitution in practice: An Appraisal of the Kenyan Case law on the right to a 
fair trial’ 2008 (2) Malawi Law Journal 135 136, 150,153. 
88 Part II, Chapter 4 of the Constitution 20102. 
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3.3.2 INTERPRETATION BY COURTS 
Three cases are discussed in relation to evidence obtained through human rights 
violations. These cases illustrate that Kenyan courts are dynamic in dealing with cases 
involving evidence obtained through human rights violations, development of principles of 
use of, and the bounds of Article 50(4) of the Constitution 2010. 
 
In Anthony Muriti v The OC Meru and two others (Muriti),89 the court recognised and used 
the common law exclusionary rule. The court was aware of the existence of Article 50(4) 
of the Constitution 2010 and the applicant’s failure to bring his application under the 
Article. The applicant was detained beyond the prescribed limit and denied access to 
counsel as required by the Constitution 2010. In addition, blood and saliva samples were 
obtained from him without his consent.90 The Court held that the samples were obtained 
through illegal means in incomplete disregard of his fundamental rights and freedoms. It 
stated that where evidence is tainted with illegality, it cannot be used in any proceedings 
against the applicant.91 The applicant did not apply for the use of Article 50(4) of the 
Constitution 2010, but instead sought redress under Articles 22, 23(3) and 258 of the 
Constitution 2010.  These Articles provide for enforcement of the bill of rights,92 authority 
to uphold and enforce the bill of rights by the courts by providing relief93 and the 
enforcement of the provisions of the constitution 2010.94 The Court still excluded the 
evidence on the basis of the common law exclusionary rule which grants courts powers to 
exercise discretion in admitting evidence which renders the trial of the accused unfair. The 
                                                          
89 [2012] eKLR 1. 
90 Pages 1- 2. 
91 Pages 1- 2. 
92  Article 22 of the constitution 2010. 
93 Article 23(3) of the Constitution 2010. 
94 Article 258 of the Constitution 2010. 
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Court in interpreting Articles 22, 23(3) and 258 validated the common law exclusionary 
rule of evidence. 
 
In addition, this case has a number of notable features which would enable the 
interpretation of Article 50(4) of the Constitution. The procedure for the application was by 
way of petition to the High Court, arising out of the criminal case pending the disposal of 
the main criminal case.95 The court was empowered to grant an injunction, restrained the 
state from relying on evidence obtained through human rights violations.96 The joint 
interpretation of Articles 22(1) and 258 of the Constitution 2010 indicate that the accused 
person and any other person who claims the violation of a right in the bill of rights has 
standing to seek redress from Court on his own behalf or on behalf of others. 
 
In Stephen Ouma Ambogo v The Hon Attorney General,97 the court stated that it required 
the applicant to give sufficient clarity of the rights violated. The Petitioner was arrested in 
an operation conducted by the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission officers. At the time of 
filing his petition, the Constitution 2010 was not in force. He sought to amend his petition 
and seek redress under Article 50 of the Constitution 2010.  The Court declined to grant 
relief to the petitioner because he did not clarify the rights that were violated.98 The court 
reasoned that the applicant’s pleadings did not stipulate which rights were violated and as 
a result, court could not make decisions in a vacuum. The Court reiterated that for one to 
get relief under Article 50(4), one had to sufficiently show the violation of his rights. 
 
                                                          
95 Page 1. 
96 Page 8. 
97 [2014] eKLR 1. 
98 Page 6. 
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In John Kipeu Kiprotich v R,99 the Court stated that section 50(4) should not be used in 
abuse of the court process. The applicant, after failing in all his appeals brought an 
application to Court, claiming that his rights were violated because the identification 
parade was not conducted in accordance with the law. In dismissing his application, the 
court hinted on the desired procedure. The court stated that the accused had exhausted 
all his remedies by way of appeal; and therefore, to entertain the petition would be to 
entertain a disguised but non-existent appeal couched in constitutional language.100  This 
means that the application under section 50(4) does not oust the procedural aspects of 
criminal law. The application should be brought in the course of filing other applications 
and not to use it as a last resort.  
 
3.3.3 CONCLUSION ON KENYA 
 Despite the existence of the constitutional provision on how to deal with evidence 
obtained through human rights violations, Kenya needs to incorporate the provisions of 
the UNCAT into its domestic laws, to bring it into conformity, with the UNCAT.101 This is 
because of three major reasons. First, since the promulgation of the Constitution 2010, 
international law has a more prominent role in Kenya’s judicial system because of the 
inclusion of a provision directly incorporating ratified treaty law into the Kenyan legal 
system as a legitimate source of law.102 Secondly, to accord the due seriousness to 
torture by providing for penalties and appropriate sanctions and thirdly, to protect the 
tenets of the right to a fair trial which include the right against self-incrimination, the right to 
                                                          
99 [2015] eKLR 1. 
100 Page 3. 
101 Concluding observations on Kenya’s Report by the Committee Against Torture; 
CAT/C/KEN/CO/1 para 8, dated 5 May 2013. 
102 Article 2(6) of the Constitution 2010. See Orago NW ‘The 2010 Kenyan Constitution and the 
hierarchical place of international law in the Kenyan domestic legal system: A comparative 
perspective’ (2013) 13 AHRLJ415  415. 
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counsel during detention, among other rights. These rights are essential to the proper 
procuration of evidence and the viability of a fair trial. Evidence obtained through human 
rights violations, especially torture, is a common occurrence in Kenya, coupled with denial 
of counsel to accused persons during detention.103 The courts are consistently, developing 
the principles to reinforce the provision in Article 50(4) on obtaining evidence obtained 
through human rights violations. 
 
3.4 POSITION IN ZIMBABWE 
3.4.1  THE CONSTITUTION 2013 
Zimbabwe has had two major constitutions; the Lancaster Constitution of 1980,104 and the 
recent Constitution of 2013 (Constitution 2013).105 This section of research limits its scope 
the Constitution 2013. Zimbabwe, just like the preceding States, has a provision in its 
constitution to cater for evidence obtained through human rights violations. It provides that   
‘In any criminal trial, evidence that has been obtained in a manner that violates any 
provision of this Chapter must be excluded if the admission of the evidence would 
render the trial unfair or would otherwise be detrimental to the administration of 
justice or the public interest.’106 
 
It must be shown that the evidence was obtained in a manner that violates any of the 
provisions of chapter 4 of the Constitution 2013. Once the applicant has proven this, the 
court has to establish the existence of one of the three grounds in the section, in exercise 
                                                          
103 Concluding observations on Kenya’s Report by the Human Rights Committee; 
CCPR/CO/83/KEN para 17, dated 29 April 2005. 
104 Constitution of the Republic of Zimbabwe 1980. 
105 Constitution of the Republic of Zimbabwe 2013. 
106 Section 70(3) of the Constitution 2013. 
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of its discretion. It has to establish the effect of the evidence on the fairness of the trial, or 
on the administration of justice or on public interest. The constitutions of South Africa and 
Kenya provide for a dual test; thus effect of the evidence on the fairness on a trial and 
administration of justice, while the Canadian charter provides for one test, effect of the trial 
on the administration of justice. It is upon proof of the existence of any of the three 
grounds that a court may exercise the constitutional directive to exclude the evidence. 
Section 70(3) of the Constitution 2013, applies if the right infringed is in the declaration of 
rights, otherwise an applicant’s resort is the common law discretionary exclusionary rule 
that existed before the enactment of the constitution. While the courts have developed 
various principles to aid the interpretation of the section (as shall be discussed in due 
course), the wording creates a threshold requirement for the need of a violation of a right 
in the declaration of rights.107 
In Zimbabwe, there is a statutory rule relating to admissibility of irrelevant evidence. It 
provides that no evidence as to any fact, matter or thing shall be admissible which is 
irrelevant or immaterial and cannot conduce to prove or disprove any point or fact at issue 
in the case which is being tried.108 This provision does not help in dealing with evidence 
obtained through human rights violations unless the evidence is irrelevant. It must be 
noted that irrelevancy of evidence is not based on an objective criteria but rather a 
subjective criteria. 
 
Searches and seizures with and without warrants are governed by the Part VI of the 
Act.109 The purpose of this is to ensure that searches and seizures are in accordance with 
                                                          
107 Chapter 4 of the Constitution 2013. 
108 Section 252 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Amendment Act 2006. 
109 Sections 47-64. 
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the law. The Act also deals with arrests with and without warrants.110 The purpose of 
these sections is to attempt to supplement the process of acquiring evidence from the time 
the liberty of an individual is curtailed to the time he is produced in court. 
 
Zimbabwe does not have any law criminalising torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment (CIDT). This is exacerbated by the fact that Zimbabwe is not a State Party to the 
UNCAT. Although it is bound by the international norm on the prohibition against torture, 
there are not clear statistics to show how Zimbabwe has upheld this norm. Although the 
Constitution 2013 prohibits torture,111 lack of a penal law affects the operation of the 
Constitutional provision. The penal law does not criminalise torture and CIDT. It simply 
provides for crimes against bodily assaults and injuries. It does not in any way supplement 
the operation of exclusion of evidence obtained through human rights violations.112 
 
Security organisations have the ability to obtain a warrant from a designated minister to 
intercept communications.113 There are four persons who are authorised to intercept upon 
grant of warrant include;  the Chief of Defence Intelligence or his or her nominee; the 
Director-General of the President’s department responsible for national security or his or 
her nominee; the Commissioner of the Zimbabwe Republic Police or his or her nominee; 
and the Commissioner-General of the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority or his or her 
nominee.114 This process creates grounds for obtaining evidence through human rights 
violations as noted below. 
 
                                                          
110 Sections 24 – 46 of Criminal Procedure and Evidence Amendment Act 2006. 
111 Section 53 of the Constitution 2013. 
112 The Criminal Law Codification and Reform Act Cap 9:23. 
113 The Interception of Communications Act, Cap 11.20, Act 06 0f 2007. 
114 Section 5. 
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The process of application is devoid of any kind of judicial control. The application for the 
interception is made to the Minister instead of a judicial officer.115 The act refers to a 
minister as the minister of transport and communications or any other minister as the 
president may appoint.116 This may be abused by the head of the executive arm of 
government. Secondly the four designate persons who may apply all belong to the 
executive arm of government. In addition, they apply to another member of the executive, 
appointed by the head of the executive.  
There is a violation of the constitutional right to privacy through use of non-judicial 
procedures to grant institutions permission to intercept communication. As a result of this, 
all the evidence obtained in violation of the right could be admitted. In instances where the 
holder of the warrant exceeds the bounds of the warrant, the Act still sanctions the 
admission of such evidence obtained, with due regard to the circumstances in which the 
evidence was obtained. Some of the circumstances include the potential effect of its 
admission or exclusion on issues of national security; and the unfairness to the accused 
that may be occasioned by its admission or exclusion.117 The literal interpretation of the 
Act is that where there is a violation of rights of an individual, the evidence may still be 
admitted on grounds on national security. Section 8 provides that evidence obtained by 
unlawful means is not admissible in criminal proceedings. It provides thus: 
 
‘Evidence which has been obtained by means of any interception effected in 
contravention of this Act shall not be admissible in any criminal proceedings except 
with the leave of the court, and in granting or refusing such leave the court shall 
have regard, among other things, to the circumstances in which it was obtained, the 
                                                          
115 Section 5(2). 
116 Section 2. 
117 Sections 7(a)-(c). 
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potential effect of its admission or exclusion on issues of national security and the 
unfairness to the accused that may be occasioned by its admission or exclusion.’ 
 
While this provision may be seen as a ray of hope to a potentially dangerous situation, it 
must be noted that the section is based on a procedure that does not reflect the role of the 
judicial in granting warrants which would otherwise have the effect of violating 
constitutional rights to privacy of an individual. Therefore section 8 is merely an attempt to 
sugar coat a terminally archaic law.  
 
Secondly the provision still grants the Courts powers, to make good and use evidence 
obtained in contravention of the Act, especially if the evidence hinges on matters of 
national security or the eminent unfairness of a trial to an accused person.  In respect to 
national security, it is not defined in the Act. In respect to unfairness, the law and the 
procedure being used to intercept evidence is always unfair to the accused person 
because it provides incriminating evidence, obtained improperly by the executive 
institutions. This Act does not compliment the provision of excluding evidence under the 
constitution. 
 
3.4.2 INTERPRETATION BY COURTS 
In S v Mundyanadzo, Moyo and Hove,118 the first accused was tortured by state 
operatives to make a confession. She brought the application seeking an order that the  
Court does not to admit the evidence of one of the witnesses, because it violated section 
70 (3) of the Constitution 2013. The Court stated that for the section to apply, it must be 
proved that first, the evidence must have been obtained in a manner that violates the 
provisions of the Constitution and secondly, the use or admission of such evidence must 
                                                          
118 Unreported case 92/ 2015 (1 July 2015). 
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be prohibited if its admission would render the trial unfair or would otherwise be 
detrimental to the administration of justice or the public interest.119 The Court noted further 
that the evidence must be relevant to the case before admissibility is determined; if the 
evidence obtained is not relevant; it cannot cause unfairness of a trial.120 This indicates 
that the court has to exercise its discretion to establish whether the evidence was obtained 
in violation of the constitutional provisions and secondly, apply the constitutional directive 
if this impugned evidence renders the trial unfair, or is not detrimental to the administration 
of justice or public interest. 
 
In Jestina Mukoko V Attorney General,121 the Applicant sought an order of a permanent 
stay of criminal proceeding because of she was tortured by the State prior to the criminal 
charges brought up against her.122 She was held in incommunicado detention for 20 
days.123 This application was brought to court before the repeal of the Constitution 1980. 
The court pronounced itself on a number of issues concerning admissibility of evidence 
through torture, which is very instrumental to the development of Zimbabwe’s 
jurisprudence. The court reiterated its role in the development of jurisprudence on torture, 
despite lack of a law criminalising the same in Zimbabwe. It used the definition of torture in 
the UNCAT and elaborated on instances under which it arises,124 the absolute nature of 
the right125 and a ground for exclusion of evidence so obtained.126 In citing the UNCAT, 
                                                          
119 Page 8. 
120 Page 9. 
121 Unreported case 36/ 2009 (20 March 2012). 
122 Page 1. 
123 Page4. 
124 Pages 12- 14, See Amris K, Pedersen ST & Rasmussen OV ‘Long Term Consequences of 
Falanga Torture’ (2009) 19 Torture 33 33; See S v Masitere 1990(2) ZLR 289(S) at 290F, S v 
Nkomo 1989 (3) ZLR 117(S) at 131F. 
125 Page 11. 
126 Page 11. 
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the Court stated it was relevant not only on the basis of upholding obligations on the part 
of a State Party, but on the principle of interpretation involved.127 
 
The Court states that use of the fruits of ill-treatment such as torture had an effect on the 
validity of these decisions, especially if there was a violation of the right to personal 
liberty.128  The court used the poisonous fruit doctrine and stated that the exclusionary rule 
would extend not only to confessions and other statements obtained under torture, but 
also to all other pieces of evidence subsequently obtained through legal means, but which 
originated from an act of torture.129 
 
In addition, the court stated that the prosecutors had a big role to play in dealing with 
evidence obtained through torture.130 The Court based its decision on the UNCAT,131 the 
Principles and Guidelines on the Rights to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa132 
and Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors.133 The Court recognised the obligation on 
prosecutors to exercise diligence in not having the admission of evidence that they know 
has been obtained through torture. Although the decision was greatly based on torture, it 
was very instrumental developing evidence obtained through human rights violations. The 
                                                          
127 Page 31. 
128 Page 16. 
129 See HRC, general comment No. 32, para. 6; see also ACHPR, Principles and Guidelines on 
the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa, section N, para. 6 (d) (i), See also 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment, Juan EM, UN Document A/HRC/25/60 para 29. 
130 Page 31 of the Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment. 
131 Article 15 of the UNCAT. 
132 Principle 15 of the Principles. 
133 Article 16 of the Guidelines. 
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Court also stated that evidence obtained through CIDT was not admissible in evidence 
and it should be given the same treatment given to evidence obtained through torture.134 
 
In Patrick Madhume v S (Madhume),135 the accused person who confessed to murder of 
three persons, applied to court not to admit the evidence. He claimed he had not made the 
confessions voluntarily. In dismissing his application, the Court stated that he had not 
discharged the onus, on a balance of probabilities, that he did not give his statements 
freely and voluntarily without having been unduly influenced thereto.136 The court relied on 
the consistency provided in the statements and the corroboration from other evidence. 
The application was not brought under section 70(3) of the Constitution 2013 but under 
the normal procedure for establishing the voluntariness of confessions under the Criminal 
Procedure and Evidence Act. An accused is required to discharge the burden of proof to 
show involuntariness in making a confession.  This requirement from the accused, in a 
criminal case is wrong, and it is doubted that it would pass the constitutional test in so far 
as it violates the right against self- incrimination and the right to remain silent.137 In other 
jurisdictions, like South Africa, in S v Zuma (Zuma),138 the facts are that, a provision in the 
Criminal Procedure Act presumed that a confession by an accused before a magistrate, 
was made freely and voluntarily.139 The accused challenged this provision on grounds that 
the application of the section violated his right against self-incrimination and the right to 
                                                          
134 Mukoko, pages 32-33;  Mujuzi JD ‘Evidence obtained through violating the right to freedom 
form torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment in South Africa’ 2015 (15) AHRLJ 
90 108. 
135 Unreported case 3/ 2015 (26 June 2014). 
136 Page 2. 
137 Section 70(1)I of the Constitution 2012. 
138 S v Zuma1995 (2) SA 642. 
139 Section 217 (1)b1(ii) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. 
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remain silent. The Court declared the provision inconsistent with the Constitution, and was 
declared invalid.140 In the same vein, Madhume would not pass the constitutionality test. 
 
3.4.3 CONCLUSION ON ZIMBABWE 
The Constitution 2012 requires that evidence obtained through human violations shall not 
be admissible  if it is shown that its admission renders the trial unfair, or  be detrimental to 
administration of justice or it should be excluded in public interest. The courts have been 
instructive enough to hold that evidence obtained through CIDT is not admissible and it 
should be given the same treatment given to evidence obtained through torture.141 
 
3.5 POSITION IN HONG KONG 
3.5.1 CONSTITUTION OF HONG KONG 
Hong Kong does not have a constitutional provision for dealing with evidence obtained 
through human rights violations.142 The Constitution  (or Basic law ) of Hong Kong 
provides for the right to freedom from torture,143 the right not to be subjected to arbitrary or 
unlawful arrest, detention or imprisonment  and the right not to be subjected to arbitrary or 
unlawful search.144 
 
The Basic law provides for rights instead, which once violated, may require that an 
accused person seeks redress from courts on the violation. Some of the rights include the 
                                                          
140 Zuma, para 39. 
141 Pages 32-33;  Mujuzi JD ‘Evidence obtained through violating the right to freedom form torture 
and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment in South Africa’ 2015 (15) AHRLJ 90108. 
142 Articles 24-42 of the Basic Law or Constitution 1990. 
143 Article 28(2). 
144 Article 29. 
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right to freedom of speech,145 freedom from arbitrary or unlawful arrest, detention and 
imprisonment.146 These rights give a basis on which one may seek to obtain redress. The 
Bill of Rights Ordinance,147 which incorporates the provisions of the ICCPR provides for 
the right against torture,148 liberty and security of a person,149 rights of persons deprived of 
liberty150 and the right to privacy of a person, family, home, correspondence, honour and 
reputation. In addition, Hong Kong has provisions in the codified laws which deal with the 
question of evidence obtained through human rights violations.151 
 
Although the Crime (Torture) Ordinance152 criminalises torture,153 it qualifies it, contrary to 
the wording of the UNCAT, where it involves public officials.154 It provides that  
‘A public official or person acting in an official capacity, whatever the official's or the 
person's nationality or citizenship, commits the offence of torture if in Hong Kong or 
elsewhere the official or the person intentionally inflicts severe pain or suffering on 
another in the performance or purported performance of his or her official duties.’155 
 
The UNCAT defines torture as follows; 
‘For the purposes of this Convention, the term "torture" means any act by which 
severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a 
                                                          
145 Article 27 of the Basic law, 
146 Article 29. 
147 Enacted 1997. 
148 Article 3. 
149 Article 4. 
150 Article 6. 
151 As will be discussed shortly. 
152 Cap 427, laws of Hong Kong. 
153 Section 2(2). 
154 Section 3(1). 
155 Section 3(1). 
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person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a 
confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is 
suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or 
for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is 
inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public 
official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or 
suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.’156 
It is clear that both provisions accommodate the elements of occasioning severe pain, 
intentionally, by a public official. The Crime (Torture) Ordinance does not, however, 
provide for the element of purpose. While this is welcome development that seems to 
widen the scope of torture as a concept, it may lead to torture of an accused for purposes 
of obtaining evidence.  
 
In addition, the law creates a defence of lawful authority, justification and any excuse for 
use of torture.157 This justification creates a barrier in the effort to deal with evidence 
obtained through torture as a human rights violation. Hong Kong has been requested by 
the CAT and the HRC to remove the justification from its statute books and use the 
international perspective on torture.158 This is because the definition accorded to torture 
limits the term public official in the Crime (Torture) Ordinance to professionals normally 
involved in the custody or treatment of persons deprived of liberty.159 The second problem 
                                                          
156 Article 1(1) of the UNCAT. 
157 Section 3(4). 
158 Concluding observation by the Human Rights Committee on Hong Kong  at 107th  Ordinary 
Session CCPR/C/CHN- HKG/CO/3 dated 29 April 2013. See also Concluding Observations  by 
the Committee against Torture at 41st Ordinary Session CAT/C/HKG/CO/4 dated 4 November 
2010. 
159 At para 5.Section 2 of the Crimes (Torture) Ordinance Cap 427. 
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is that, the definition of public official is too restrictive and may create practical loopholes 
preventing effective prosecution of torture.160 
While the CAT calls upon each State Party to ensure that all parts of its Government 
adhere to the definition set forth in the Convention for the purpose of defining the 
obligations of the State, it notes that serious discrepancies between the Convention's 
definition and that incorporated into domestic law may create actual or potential loopholes 
for impunity.161 The defence should be removed from the statute books to ensure that use 
of lawful authority is not used to violate rights of an accused in the process of obtaining 
evidence.  
 
3.5.2 INTERPRETATION BY COURTS 
In HKSAR v. Li Man Tak and Others (Tak),162 the court held that the secret interception of 
communications had been inconsistent with the requirements of Article 30 of the Basic 
Law and thereby unlawful. The court warned that, in future criminal trials, investigating 
agencies may be held to have acted in bad faith if they continued the practice of the secret 
monitoring of communications without a legislative basis upon which to do so. That 
warning, of course, came in the wake of a finding that the existing legislation did not meet 
the requirements of the Basic Law or the Bill of Rights. The court in its ruling identified the 
need to realign the law on the admissibility of evidence in so far as surveillance was 
concerned. This marked a great step towards the development of case law to guide 
admissibility of evidence obtained through human rights violations. 
 
                                                          
160 At para 5. 
161 UN Committee Against Torture (CAT), General Comment No. 2: Implementation of Article 2 by 
States Parties, 24 January 2008, CAT/C/GC/2, para 9. 
162 [2005] HKEC 1308. 
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In HKSAR v. Chan Kau Tai (Chan),163 the court stated that first; account must be taken of 
any breach of rights contained in the Basic Law or the ICCPR. Second, the breach will 
not, however, automatically result in the exclusion of the evidence obtained in 
consequence of the breach and thirdly, that in exercise of its discretion; the court shall 
balance the nature of the right involved and the extent of the breach before making a 
decision on the admissibility of the evidence. 
 
In HKSAR v. Wong Kwok Hung (Wong),164 the court laid two grounds for admissibility of 
the evidence. First, that the right to privacy was not breached in bad faith; Secondly, it was 
clear in the circumstances of the case, that the breach of that right could not outweigh the 
public interest in detecting crimes involving the importation or exportation and sale of very 
large quantities of dangerous drugs. As a result the evidence was admitted. 
 
In HKSAR v. Shum Chiu and Others (Chiu),165 having found that the secret recording of 
an accused talking with his solicitors constituted an abuse of process so profound as to 
challenge the integrity of the justice system, the court went on to express the view that 
legislation regulating the secret monitoring of private communications should be 
introduced without delay so that the ‘guarding of the guards’ was not left only to the courts. 
This showed that the court did not support the use of illegally obtained evidence. It still fell 
short of efficacy in so far as the court did not lay down the rules for admissibility of such 
evidence. 
 
                                                          
163 [2006] 1 HKLRD 400 at pp 443A – 448F. 
164 [2007] 2 HKLRD 621 
165 [2011] 2 HKLRD 746 (CA). 
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In HKSAR v Muhammad Riaz Khan (Khan),166 the Court of Final Appeal in Hong Kong 
considered the factors that allow a court to admit evidence which has been obtained in 
breach of constitutional rights. Such evidence can be received if, upon careful examination 
of the circumstances, its reception (a) is conducive to a fair trial, (b) is reconcilable with 
the respect due to the right or rights concerned, and (c) appears unlikely to encourage any 
future breaches of those rights.167 
 
The five cases above show a consistent trend in the development of principles that guide 
courts in dealing with impugned evidence, despite lack of a constitutional provision. The 
courts have called for a need to re-align the existing legislation with the rights in the basic 
law, where the legislation perpetuates a violation of human rights.168 Much as the courts 
recognise the presumption that all evidence is admissible, they have a duty to decide on 
admission of impugned evidence. This duty requires balancing the nature of the right 
against the extent of its violation before deciding on its admissibility.169  The failure by the 
Court to lay down the rules on admissibility in Chiu, despite lack of support for the state’s 
violation of an accused’s rights; Khan provided the perfect opportunity to lay down the 
rules on admissibility of evidence.  
 
3.5.3 CONCLUSION ON HONG KONG 
Just like the South Africa, Canada, Kenya and Zimbabwe, admission of evidence in Hon 
Kong on the basis of the first ground in Khan, addresses entails establishing if the 
                                                          
166 [2012] HKFCA 38; FACCI 13/2010. 
167 Mujuzi JD ‘The admissibility of evidence obtained as a result of violating the accused persons’ 
rights: analyzing the test set by the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal in HSAR  Muhammad 
Riaz Khan, (2012)16 International Journal of Evidence & Proof 425 425. 
168 See Tak generally. 
169 See Chan and Wong generally. 
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admission will have an effect on the fairness of the trial.170 The two grounds cover, 
whether it will be detrimental to the administration of justice. The third ground, It also takes 
into consideration the interests of society, like Canada (after the decision in Grant) and 
Zimbabwe. So despite lack of a constitutional provision, the case law has developed 
substantially to deal with evidence obtained through human rights violations. 
 
3.6 CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the Constitution of South Africa provides a directive to exclude all evidence 
obtained in a manner that violates a right in the bill of rights, if its admission would render 
the trial unfair or would otherwise be detrimental to the administration of justice. Courts 
exercise discretion to establish if the impugned evidence would be unfair to the trial or 
places the administration of justice into disrepute. Like Canada, South Africa requires the 
existence of a causal link. The degree of causation is however, not a determinant for the 
exclusion of evidence.  However, while, violation of a third party’s rights in South Africa 
and Kenya; may be  a ground for an accused person to challenge the impugned evidence, 
Canada requires the accused proves his rights were violated in obtaining evidence.  The 
researcher is not aware of Hong Kong using the Canadian approach.  It is clear that the 
Constitution 2012 of Zimbabwe states that the exclusion applies only to criminal trials; the 
wording does not create a different modes of application in South Africa, Canada and 
Kenya. This is because their respective constitutions require the provisions apply only 
where a right in the bill of rights is violated. Hong Kong has consistent case law which 
enhances the need for fairness of the trial, administration of justice and public interest 
before the decision to admit evidence obtained through human rights violations is made.  
                                                          
170 Mujuzi JD ‘The admissibility of evidence obtained as a result of violating the accused persons’ 
rights: analyzing the test set by the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal in HSAR  Muhammad 
Riaz Khan, (2012)16 International Journal of Evidence & Proof 425 429. 
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This chapter is significant to the study because it analyses the status of evidence in the 
four countries and distinguishes the interpretation involved in the application of the various 
constitutional provisions. This adds voice to the development of knowledge in the 
comparative study of the four countries. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
STATUS OF EVIDENCE OBTAINED THROUGH HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN 
UGANDA 
4.  INTRODUCTION 
Chapter three dealt with the status of evidence obtained through human rights violations in 
South Africa, Canada, Zimbabwe, Kenya and Hong Kong. This chapter deals with the 
status of evidence obtained through human rights violations in Uganda.  An examination 
of the drafting history of all the constitutions enacted in Uganda since independence, is 
made.1 Particular regard is given to the drafting history by the Constituent Assembly and 
the finding of the Uganda Constitutional Commission to establish if the silence of the 
Constitution is by default or design of the drafters.  
 
Thereafter, an examination of pieces of legislation that deal with criminal justice, to 
establish whether, unlike the Constitution, they provide rules on dealing with evidence 
through human rights violations. A chronological analysis of case law gives the trend 
courts have followed in dealing with this evidence.  The case law is examined to show 
how they have been decided and whether they offer consistency in developing rules to be 
followed. A conclusion is then provided on the status of evidence obtained through 
human rights violations in Uganda.  
 
As noted in chapter one, the Constitution is silent on evidence obtained through human 
rights violations. It acknowledges that fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual 
are inherent and not granted by the State, and that the bill of rights shall be respected, 
upheld and promoted by all persons, organs and agencies of government.2 
                                                          
1 Constitutions of the Republic of Uganda 1962, 1967 and 1995. 
2 Constitution of 1995, article 20.  
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In addition, any person who claims that a fundamental or other right or freedom has been 
infringed or threatened, may apply to a competent court for redress.3 While these 
provisions guarantee rights and offer enforcement, they do not provide a directive on how 
to deal with evidence obtained through human rights violations.   
 
The constitution provides for rights which, when violated in the course of gathering 
evidence, require a directive  on how to deal with evidence obtained through human rights 
violations. These rights include, the right to a fair hearing,4 presumption of innocence until 
proven guilty,5 and to be charged in accordance with the law.6 Other rights are the right to   
privacy,7 personal liberty8 and the right against self-incrimination.9 
 
4.1  DRAFTING HISTORY OF CONSTITUTIONS OF UGANDA 
Uganda has had a turbulent constitutional history, with four constitutions since 
independence.10 A look at the drafting history of the four constitutions gives an insight into 
the silence of the Constitution on how to deal with evidence obtained through human 
rights violations.  
 
The Constitution 1962, referred to as the Independence Constitution, was drafted in 
London by the British, as the colonial masters.11 An examination of the broader context 
                                                          
3 Article 50. 
4 Article 28. 
5 Article 28(3)a Constitution of 1995. 
6 Article 28(7) Constitution of 1995. 
7 Article 27. 
8 Article 23. 
9 Article 28(11) Constitution of 1995. 
10 Constitutions 1962, 1966, 1967 and 1995. See Wapakhabulo J ‘Managing the constitution- 
making process in Uganda’ in Hyden G & Venter D Constitution-making and democratization in 
Africa (2001)114 114- 31 generally. 
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within which it was drafted reveals that it was more of a political constitution geared at 
creating a balance of interests between political factions Uganda.12 It did not have a 
provision relating to status of evidence obtained through human rights violations.  
The suspension of the Constitution 1962 was as a result of the constitutional crisis of 
1966, which led to the Pigeon- Hole Constitution of 1966 and the subsequent constitution 
of 1967 (Constitution 1967).13 The Constitution 1967, just like the earlier two versions did 
not have a provision relating to evidence obtained through human rights violations. This is 
partly because the broader context for drafting it was purely for political ends to be met, 
which is beyond the scope of this research paper.14 
 
The Constitution was largely based on the recommendations of the Report of the Uganda 
Constitutional Commission (Odoki Commission).15 This Report did not specifically deal 
with evidence obtained through human rights violations. It provided for the most violated 
rights in Uganda’s history,16 and recommended respect of the right to personal liberty,17 
right to a fair hearing,18 and conduct of a fair trial19 among other rights.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                
11 Wapakhabulo J ‘Managing the constitution-making process in Uganda’ in Hyden G & Venter D 
Constitution-making and democratization in Africa (2001)114 114. 
12 Tripp AM, ‘The politics of Constitutional making in Uganda in Laurel EM & Loius A, Framing the 
state in times of transition, Case Studies in Constitution Making (2010) 158 159. 
13 Tripp AM, ‘The politics of Constitutional making in Uganda in Laurel et al in   Framing the state 
in times of transition, Case Studies in Constitution Making (2010) 158 160. 
14 See Furley O & Katalikawe J ‘Constitutional Reform in Uganda: The New Approach’ 1997 (96) 
African Affairs  243 261, Barya  JJ  The Making of Uganda’s 1995 Constitution: Achieving 
Consensus by Law (2000) 42- 46, Mutiibwa P  Uganda since Independence: A Story of 
Unfulfilled Hopes (1992) 58, Mukholi D A Complete Guide to Uganda’s Fourth Constitution: 
History, Politics, and the Law (1995) generally.  
15 The Report of the Uganda Constitutional Commission dated 31 December 1992. The Odoki 
Commission was appointed in accordance with the Constitutional Commission Statute 5 of 
1988. 
16 The Report of the Odoki Commission; pages 146 – 147, paras 7.52- 7.60. 
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The Report provided for enforcement of rights in the draft constitution,20 and 
recommended for the establishment of the Uganda Human Rights Commission to 
exercise quasi-judicial powers in the enforcement and investigation of human rights 
issues.21 The functions handed down to the Uganda Human Rights Commission, however, 
did not include a directive on how to deal with evidence obtained through human rights 
violations. In addition, the Uganda Human Rights Commission was not accorded the 
status of a court of record.22 
 
When the draft Constitution was presented to the Constituent Assembly for debate, the 
delegates acknowledged two issues that are instructive on the final outcome of the 
Constitution. First, that the aim of the bill of rights was to enhance the protection, 
promotion and enjoyment of human rights23 and secondly, Uganda being a signatory to 
many international instruments, its commitment would be judged by the manner in which 
the Constitution provided safeguards to avoid a violation of human rights in the country.24 
The Constituent Assembly, however, through the entire debates on the bill of rights, did 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
17 Page 180, para 7.153. See article 35 of draft Constitution of 1995; at page 764. 
18 Pages 181- 183, paras 7.152- 7.169. See article 37 of draft Constitution of 1995; at page 765. 
19 Pages 183, paras 7.168- 7.169. See article 40 of draft Constitution of 1995; at page 765. 
20 Appendix 1 to the Report of the Odoki Commission. 
21Pages 186- 188, paras 7.178- 7.181. See articles 42-43 of draft Constitution of 1995; at page 
767. 
22Constitution of 1995, article 129. 
23 Submission of Hon. Cecil Ogwal, page 1809 of the official report of the proceedings of 
Constituent Assembly (CA proceedings) dated 31 August 1994. 
24 Submission of Hon. Cecil Ogwal, page 1809 of CA proceedings dated 31 August 1994. 
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not debate on the issue of a directive on evidence obtained through human violations. The 
debates, to a great extent, focused on the recommendations of the Odoki Commission.25 
 
4.2 LEGISLATION 
Current pieces of legislation do not adequately provide for a mode of dealing with 
evidence obtained through human rights violations. The Prevention and Prohibition of 
Torture Act26 has a provision, which is limited to evidence obtained through torture and 
CIDT. It provides that: 
‘any information, confession or admission obtained from a person by means of 
torture is inadmissible in evidence against that person in any proceedings.’27 
This section limits its operation to evidence obtained through torture and CIDT. This 
means that evidence obtained through human rights violations other than torture is not 
covered by the Prevention and Prohibition of Torture Act.28 
 
The Evidence Act29 places emphasis on admissibility of confessions which is one form of 
evidence that is susceptible to human rights violations.30 Other forms of evidence arising 
from illegal searches, autoptic evidence, vigilantee evidence are not covered by the 
legislation.31 The Act regulates the relevance and admissibility of evidence in courts32 and 
                                                          
25 Report of the proceedings of Constituent Assembly (CA proceedings) generally dated 31 August 
1994. 
26 Act 3 of 2012. 
27 Section 14. 
28 See Mujuzi JD ‘Issues to grapple with in implementing the Uganda Prevention and Prohibition of 
Torture Act’ (2012) 1 International Human Rights Law Review  382 382-94 generally. 
29 Evidence Act Cap 6, Laws of Uganda. 
30 Sections 23 to 27. 
31 See Zeffert DT &Paizes AP The South Africa Law of Evidence 2ed (2008) and Schwikkard PJ & 
Van der Merwe SE Principles of Evidence 3ed (2009) generally.   
32 Sections 24- 26. 
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provides guidelines on recording of confessions.33 It provides that a confession which 
would otherwise be inadmissible, may still be admitted in evidence, if in the view of Court, 
the impression making it inadmissible is removed.34 The court, therefore, exercises 
discretion either to admit or not to admit the evidence.35  Section 24 of the Evidence Act 
provides that a confession which would be irrelevant because it was obtained through 
violence, force, threat, inducement or promise may be relevant. This is possible if the 
prosecution proves to the court that there was no violence, force, threat, inducement or 
promise used in obtaining the confession. The Evidence Act36 contains provisions that 
deal with confessions to a great extent, than other forms of evidence obtained through 
human rights violations. Lack of a rule dealing with evidence obtained through human 
rights violations, other than confessions affects narrows the scope of application of the 
Evidence Act in dealing with evidence obtained through human rights violations. 
 
The Criminal Procedure Code Act37 makes provision for the procedure to be followed in 
criminal cases,38 and the modes of arrest and search of an accused person.39 The Act is 
also silent on how to deal with evidence obtained through human rights violations, such 
as, illegal arrests and searches. The Magistrates Courts Act40 and the Trial on Indictments 
Act41 are equally silent on how to handle evidence obtained through human rights 
violations. This silence does not, however, remedy the situation. 
                                                          
33 Section 23. 
34 Section 25. 
35 Section 25. 
36 The Evidence Act Cap 100. 
37 The Criminal Procedure Code Act Cap 116, Laws of Uganda. 
38 Long title of the Criminal Procedure Code Act Cap116, Laws of Uganda. 
39 Sections 2- 27. 
40 Magistrates Courts Act Cap 16, Laws of Uganda. 
41 Trial on Indictments Act Cap 23, Laws of Uganda. 
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The Regulation of Interception of Communications Act42 allows authorised persons from 
security organisations to obtain a warrant from a designated judge to intercept 
communications.43 In instances where the holder of the warrant exceeds the bounds of the 
warrant, the Act still sanctions the admission of such evidence obtained, with due regard 
to the circumstances in which the evidence was obtained. Some of the circumstances 
include the potential effect of its admission or exclusion on issues of national security; and 
the unfairness to the accused that may be occasioned by its admission or exclusion.44 
This pities individuals at the mercy of state organs The literal interpretation of the Act is 
that where there is a violation of rights of an individual, the evidence may still be admitted 
on grounds on national security. 
 
4.3 CASE LAW 
The decisions handed down by courts have been inconsistent in dealing with evidence 
obtained through human rights violations. In Namulobi Hasadi v Uganda (Namulobi),45 the 
Court upheld the use of a confession obtained from an accused person after spending a 
week in custody. A conviction was sustained because it did not occasion a miscarriage of 
justice.46 This unsigned confession was recorded in a room full of people, in a language 
he did not understand.47  There was a pointing-out by the accused person after 72 hours 
in custody in absence of counsel.48 This was a violation of his right to a fair trial.49 
                                                          
42 Regulation of Interception of Communications Act 18 of 2010 available at http://www.ulii.org 
(accessed 6 September 2014). 
43 Section 4. 
44 Sections 7(a)-(c). 
45 Namulobi Hasadi v Uganda  unreported case no16/ 1997 (13 July 1998). 
46 Page 4. 
47 Page 4. 
48 Page 6, See Constitution of 1995, article 23(5). 
49 Constitution of 1995, article 23 generally. 
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The Court noted that there was overwhelming evidence to sustain the conviction of the 
accused.50 This confession should not have been admitted in evidence in light of the 
glaringly irregularities in violations of the accused’s rights. This admission had a dual 
negative effect. Firstly, it created inconsistency in the development of jurisprudence on 
evidence obtained through human rights violations. Secondly, it rendered the trial unfair 
and caused disrepute on the administration of justice in so far as the confession obtained 
in violation of the accused’s right to personal liberty.   
 
In Uganda v Kalawudio Wamala (Kalawudio),51 the accused made a confession after 
being in police custody for ten days instead of 48 hours.52 The Court declined to admit the 
confession because it was repugnant to the values and standards set forth in the new 
Constitution.53 The Court declined to admit the confession because of two reasons. First, 
the Court upheld the need to protect the accused, uphold public interest and to deter 
persons and organs of government from condoning the breach of human rights.54 
Secondly, admission of the confession would be against the tenets of the right to a fair 
trial.55 This was indicative of the Court’s will to develop case law on the exclusionary rule.  
 
The Court acknowledged that despite lack of a similar provision like the one in the 
Canadian Charter,56 Article 20(2) and 50 of the Constitution would have the same effect.57 
                                                          
50 Walusimbi page 2, para 2. 
51 Uganda v Kalawudio Wamala  unreported case no 442/ 1996 (6 November 1996). 
52 At para 19; see Article 23(3)b of the Constitution of 1995. 
53 At para 26. 
54 At para 28. 
55 At paras 31-33. 
56 Canadian Charter, section 24(2). 
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The effect is not felt due to lack of a constitutional directive. This is an indication that the 
court would not admit evidence obtained through human rights violations, if it rendered the 
trial unfair.58 The Court also stated that the burden of proof was on the prosecution, on a 
balance of probabilities to prove that the evidence was not obtained in violation of the 
rights of an accused.59 In addition, presence of good faith did not amount to a special 
reason to warrant the admission of evidence obtained through human rights violations.60  
Unfortunately, this was a High Court decision which could not overturn the precedent set 
by the Supreme Court in Namulobi.  
 
In Ssewankambo Francis, Kiwanuka Paul, Mutaya Muzairu v Uganda (Ssewankambo),61 
the appellants sought to have their convictions set aside because of repudiated 
confessions. The confessions relied on by the accused were not subjected to a trial-within-
a-trial to ascertain whether they were made voluntarily. The Court in allowing the appeal 
stated first, that the voluntariness of making the confessions was not established by the 
trial Court.62 Secondly, the mode of acquiring the confession was improper and thirdly, 
there was evidence of assault of the accused before they signed the confessions.63 
The court therefore, reiterated the principle that in cases involving evidence obtained 
through human rights violations, the evidence had to be subjected to a test as to whether 
it was made voluntarily. The decision served a triple purpose; it enhanced the presumption 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
57 At paras 25, 34; Reference made to R v Stillman [1997] 1 SCR 607, Micheal Feeney v R [1997] 
2 SCR 13, R v Duguay [1989] 1 SCR 93.    
58 Section 24(2) of the Canadian Charter. 
59 At para 25. 
60 At para 35. 
61 Ssewankambo Francis, Kiwanuka Paul, Mutaya Muzairu v Uganda  unreported case no 33 / 
2001 (20  February 2003). 
62 Page 9. 
63 Page 9. 
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of innocence which requires a trial court to be cautious in admitting evidence that derails 
this principle and buttressed the need for the procedure of a trial-within-a-trial to ascertain 
the voluntariness of making the confession. It also upheld the right against self-
incrimination of an accused from an adjudication perspective. This decision buttressed the 
duty on courts to ensure that they do not provide an enabling environment for self- 
incrimination of the accused.64 
 
In Walugembe Henry, Ssali Paul Sande and Kamanzi Joseph v Uganda (Walugembe),65 
the accused were convicted of robbery. On second appeal, Ssewankambo was followed. 
The Court developed the jurisprudence further by enhancing the issue of the onus of proof 
in ascertaining the voluntariness of making a confession. It stated that the onus of proof 
was on the prosecution and not the accused.66 To discharge this onus, therefore, the 
prosecution is expected to prove that there was no violence, force, threat, inducement or 
promise to cause the receipt of an untrue confession.67  In addition, the recording of the 
confession must adhere to the procedure of recording the statement in a language the 
accused understands, and not in the presence of another officer.68 The Court did not 
however pronounce itself on the standard of proof. It however, by implication validated the 
decision in Kalawudio. 
 
                                                          
64 Page 9. See also Kawoya Joseph v Uganda, unreported case no 50/ 1999, Edward Kawoya v 
Uganda, unreported case no 4/1999,  Kwoba v Uganda, unreported case no 2/2000 as 
collectively reported in Ssewankambo at page 9. 
65 Walugembe Henry, Ssali Paul Sande and Kamanzi Joseph v  Uganda unreported case no 
39/2003 ( 1 November 2005).  
66 Page 6. 
67 Page 6. See section 24 of the Evidence Act Cap 100 laws of Uganda. 
68 Pages 5, 10. See Festo Androa Assenua and Others v Uganda Unreported case no 1/ 1998, (2  
October 1998). 
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In Kizza Besigye v the Attorney General,69 the Court stated that it could not sanction the 
continued prosecution of the petitioners where during the proceedings, their human rights 
had been violated.70 The court referred to persuasive decisions from other jurisdictions 
such as Kenya and the United Kingdom.71 While this principle would apply to evidence 
obtained through human rights violations, the background to the case leaves its 
application shrouded in mystery. First, the case hinged on the siege of the High Court 
Chambers by the military, while cases were being adjudicated. Secondly, the court did not 
comment on evidence obtained through human rights violations in the course of 
investigations. It dealt with the conduct of state agencies in the course of a trial. The right 
to a fair trial referred to was premised on the interruption of the court adjudicating a 
criminal case, and not on the violation of rights during the collection of evidence.  While it 
was agreed to, by the Court that the continued detention of the accused persons would 
have been a violation of their rights to liberty and security of person, this was not 
addressed by the Court. This could be partly because the accused raised the grounds but 
failed to substantiate them.72 
 
In Uganda v Robert Ssekabira and 10 others,73 the Court followed the principle handed 
down in Besigye,74 and Kalawudio75 and held that improper evidence or evidence obtained 
through human rights violations should not be admitted if it affects the accused’s right to a 
                                                          
69 Kizza Besigye v the Attorney General Unreported case no 07/2007 (12 October 2010) 
70 Page 38. 
71 See Albanus Mwasia Mutua v R   [2006] eKLR.3, R v Amos Karuga Karatu [2008] eKLR and R v 
Horseferry Road Magistrates Ex parte Bennet [1994] 1 A.C. 42. See also Gerald Macharia 
Githuku v  Republic [2007] eKLR. 
72 Kizza Besigye v the Attorney General Unreported case no 07/2007 (12 October 2010), para 
1(d)(vii), page 4. 
73 Uganda v Robert Sekabira and 10 others unreported case no 85/2010 (14 May 2014). 
74 Page 4, 7. 
75 Page 8. 
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fair trial. The rights that were violated were the right to liberty and the impropriety involved 
use of police officers to conduct investigation without the consent of the DPP.76 
The Court noted the failure of the prosecution to guide it,77 but did not use this opportunity 
to enhance the role of prosecutors in guiding court in instances where they had knowledge 
of evidence obtained in violation of the accused’s rights.78 
 
4.3.1 ENTRAPMENTS 
There is no law regulating entrapments in Uganda. This practice of police trappings is an 
unusual crime prevention strategy based predominantly upon deceptive law enforcement 
techniques.79 Unlike other jurisdictions like South Africa, where entrapments are within 
specified guidelines,80 it is not the case in Uganda. There are instances where the police 
go beyond providing an opportunity for commission of an offence. The Courts recognise 
traps as an aid to arrest of suspects,81 and the human rights violation that accompany the 
traps.82 Issues such as traps set out of malice do not have a yardstick. While court noted 
existence of a poor relationship between the person laying the trap and the victim in 
                                                          
76 Page 14-18. 
77 Page 17-18. 
78 See The Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa, 
DOC/OS(XXX)247, principle F generally. See also Mujuzi JD ‘The African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights and the Admissibility of evidence obtained as a result of torture, 
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment: Egyptian initiative for Personal Rights and Interights v 
Arab Republic of Egypt’ 2013 (17) International Journal of Evidence and Proof 284-89 
generally. 
79 Narnia B. Lead us not into temptation; the criminal liability of the trappe revisited; (1999) 12 
SAJCJ 317 317. 
80 Section 252A of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. 
81 Uganda v Cheptuke David Kaye (Cheptuke) Unreported case no 121/2010 (11 November   
2010). 
82 Unreported case no 19/2011 (5 January 2012), page 9. 
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Cheptuke,83 but it did not delve into that issue.  In Uganda v Muwonge Emmanuel,84 
however, the court described the malice as an acute itch to prosecute the accused, such 
that proper investigations were jettisoned to the winds.   
In addition, the police abuses its own procedure to the detriment of the accused person. In 
In Uganda v Ekungu Simon (Ekungu),85 the accused person’s officemates were ordered 
by the arresting officers to sign search certificates as witnesses yet they were not in the 
room when the money was found.86 The court stated that the mode of arrest and the 
requirements for search certificates needed to be re-examined.87 The illegality in procuring 
the search certificate and the violation of the accused’s right to dignity88 were upheld by 
court in allowing the accused’s appeal. Since courts are becoming cognisant of the use of 
entrapment and showing their distaste for them, it is only proper that they are regulated. 
 
4.4 CONCLUSION 
This research shows that the status of evidence obtained through human rights violations 
is significant in light of the legislative framework and the judicial development of 
jurisprudence on evidence obtained through human rights violations. The Constitution is 
silent on how courts should handle evidence obtained through human rights violations. 
The constitution does create a working framework for the enforcement of the right to a fair 
hearing for an accused person, but fails to secure strict observance of this right in so far 
as it is silent on how to deal with evidence obtained through human right violations.  Lack 
of statutory provisions in legislation for criminal procedure, exacerbates the situation. 
                                                          
83 Cheptuke, page 3.  
84 Unreported case no 738/2009 (3 September 2009). 
85 Unreported case no 19/2011 (5 January 2012). 
86 Unreported case no 19/2011 (5 January 2012), page 9. 
87 Ekungu page 10. 
88 Article 34 of the Constitution of 1995. 
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It is only in cases where the courts have attempted to develop jurisprudence that earlier 
cases were referred to. In cases where the jurisprudence was not developed, there was 
no reference to the earlier cases on the matter of evidence obtained through human rights 
violations. In addition, the courts have laid emphasis on the procedural aspects governing 
obtaining of confessions instead of dealing with the violation of human rights leading to the 
recording of the confessions. The most notable rights violated were the presumption of 
innocence, right to counsel, right to personal liberty, CIDT and other pre-trial rights to a fair 
trial.  
 
This creates the need to look at the status of improperly obtained evidence in Uganda. 
While there is a thin line between evidence obtained through human rights violations and 
improperly obtained evidence, a study of the conduct of the investigating organs shall help 
in ascertaining the status of this evidence. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
STATUS OF ILLEGALLY OR IMPROPERLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE IN UGANDA 
5.  INTRODUCTION 
Chapter four dealt with the status of evidence obtained through human rights violations in 
Uganda. It was established that the Constitution is silent and the courts have been 
inconsistent in developing jurisprudence to deal with evidence obtained through human 
rights violations. Chapter five deals with how courts have grappled with improperly 
obtained evidence and cases of police conduct at pre-trial inquiries. Improperly obtained 
evidence includes; arrests, searches, conduct of identification parades, mode of obtaining 
autoptic evidence, improperly obtained confessions, and use of entrapments. This 
selection focusing on illegal searches, identification parades, confessions and 
entrapments, helps in achieving a fair analysis of improperly obtained evidence.  
 
This chapter follows the rationale that the Constitution is silent on evidence obtained 
through human rights violations and improperly obtained evidence. On this basis, courts 
may admit improperly obtained evidence, if in their view, the improprieties do not occasion 
injustice to the accused, or if there is corroboration or independent evidence to prove facts 
in issue. 
 
5.1 CONCEPTUALIZATION OF IMPROPERLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE 
Improperly or illegally obtained evidence, unlike evidence obtained through human rights 
violations, refers to evidence obtained without following the right procedure. Improperly 
obtained evidence may exist where there has been no infringement of a constitutional 
right.1 In Uganda, improperly obtained evidence is governed by the principle handed down 
                                                          
1As shall be discussed shortly. 
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in Kurumah s/o Kairu v R2 that evidence improperly obtained in admissible and the court is 
not concerned with how it was obtained. In addition, court has discretion to not to allow the 
admission of improperly obtained evidence if, its admission will operate unfairly against 
the accused.3 This part of the study examines how courts have dealt with evidence 
obtained through improper conduct.  
 
5.2 CONFESSIONS 
The rules for recording of confessions were stated in Festo Androa Asenua v Uganda,4 
and they require that an accused is cautioned before the statement is made. In addition, if 
the recording is by a police officer, he should be at the level of Assistant Inspector of 
Police or higher. The confession should be recorded by the officer in a language that the 
accused understands. The room in which the confession is being made, should have only 
two people, unless an interpreter is required.5 
 
There are no guidelines in case law on assessing the admission of improperly obtained 
confessions, because injustice to the accused is an objective test which depends on the 
merits of each case. To a great extent however, such confessions are admitted.  
In Namulobi Hasadi v Uganda (Namulobi),6 the Court upheld a conviction based on an 
unsigned confession, recorded in a room full of people, in a language the accused did not 
understand.7  The court held that it did not occasion a miscarriage of justice because the 
                                                          
2 (1955) AC 197, 203; Andrew LT & Susan N ‘Improperly obtained evidence in the commonwealth’ 
(2001)11 International Journal of Evidence & Proof 75 78. 
3 Kuruma page 203. 
4 Festo Androa Asenua v Uganda Unreported case no 1/1998 ( 2 October 1998) pp.26-30. 
5 Page 27. 
6 Namulobi Hasadi v Uganda  unreported case no16/ 1997 (13 July 1998). 
7 Page 4. 
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accused did not complain about it.8 The accused did not complain because he did not 
know the guidelines, and as a result could not bring them to the attention of the court. 
Although the accused was represented, his ignorance of the guidelines should not have 
been used as a ground to hold that there was no injustice occasioned to him.  
 
In Ssewankambo Francis, Kiwanuka Paul, Mutaya Muzairu v Uganda (Ssewankambo),9 a 
police officer recorded two statements from the first and second appellant.  Secondly, the 
lower courts did not subject the admissibility of the confessions to a trial within a trial.10  
The Court in allowing the appeal stated first, that the voluntariness of making the 
confessions was not established by the trial Court.11 Secondly, the mode of acquiring the 
confessions was improper and thirdly, there was evidence of assault of the accused 
before they signed the confessions.12 This indicated a shift in the exercise of discretion by 
the courts in ascertaining whether evidence improperly obtained would be admitted. 
 
The court therefore, reiterated the principle that in cases involving impugned evidence, the 
confession had to be subjected to a test as to whether it was made voluntarily. The 
decision served a triple purpose; it enhanced the presumption of innocence which requires 
a trial court to be cautious in admitting evidence that derails this principle and buttressed 
the need for the procedure of a trial-within-a-trial to ascertain the voluntariness of making 
the confession. It also upheld the right against self-incrimination of an accused from an 
                                                          
8 Page 4. 
9 Ssewankambo Francis, Kiwanuka Paul, Mutaya Muzairu v Uganda unreported case no 33/ 2001 
(20 February 2003). 
10 Page 9-10 of the judgment. 
11 Page 9. 
12 Page 9. 
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adjudication perspective. This decision buttressed the duty on courts to ensure that they 
do not provide an enabling environment for self- incrimination of the accused.13 
 
In Mweru Ali, Abas Kalema, Sulaiman Senkumbi v Uganda,14 the second appellant 
averred that the confession was irregularly obtained in so far as it was not recorded in a 
language he understood.15  The Court held that irregular recording of the confession in 
English, a language he did not understand did not occasion any injustice to the appellant, 
because the it was read back to the appellant before he signed it.16 This is an indication 
that courts are more than willing to admit an improperly obtained confession if the 
impropriety can be excused, and the excuse does not operate unfavourably against the 
accused person. 
 
In addition to the above, if the impropriety is not a material departure from the rules of 
recording a statement, the court shall admit it. In Nashaba Paddy v Uganda,17 the 
appellant was not informed of the charge against him, neither was it recorded in a 
language he understood. In addition, the statement recorded by the Magistrate was 
recorded by the court clerk instead of the Magistrate.18 The court held that the 
irregularities by the magistrate were not prohibited by the law, and the procedure adopted 
was not a material departure from the guidelines for recording confessions.19 The court 
                                                          
13  Page 9 of the judgment. See also Kawoya Joseph v Uganda, unreported case no 50/ 1999,  
Edward Kawoya v Uganda, unreported case no 4/1999,  Kwoba v Uganda, unreported case no 
2/2000 as collectively reported in Ssewankambo. 
14  Mweru Ali, Abas Kalema, Sulaiman Senkumbi v Uganda unreported case no 33/ 2002 (21 
August 2003). 
15  Page 10 of judgment. 
16  Page 11. 
17  Nashaba Paddy v Uganda unreported case no 39/2000 (9 August 2000). 
18  Pages 4-5. 
19  Page 6. 
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stated further, that although the only omission was that of the magistrate not certifying the 
charge and caution statement, it was cured by the confirmation of the appellant that the 
recording was accurate.20 This reiterates the position that courts are inclined to admit 
improperly obtained statement if the impropriety does not occasion injustice to the 
accused. The yardstick for measuring the impropriety, whether on grounds of unfairness 
to the trial, disrepute to the administration of justice or public policy is not clear.  
 
In Walugembe Henry, Ssali Paul Sande and Kamanzi Joseph v Uganda (Walugembe),21 
the confessions of the first two appellants had been recorded by the same police officer, 
and in English rather than a language the accused persons understood. The confession of 
the second appellant was recorded in the presence of another officer.22   The Court was of 
the view that the voluntariness of the confessions was not meticulously tested by the lower 
court and since the procedure was not adhered to, the confessions were rendered 
inadmissible.23 While the Court did not however pronounce itself on the standard of proof 
in proving voluntariness of confessions, it however, by implication validated the decision in 
Kalawudio. 
 
5.3 ENTRAPMENTS 
While evidence from entrapments involves a violation of the right to privacy and dignity, 
the irregularities in the collection of evidence are overlooked by courts. Use of 
entrapments by police, is an unusual crime prevention strategy based predominantly upon 
                                                          
20  Page 7. 
21  Walugembe Henry, Ssali Paul Sande and Kamanzi Joseph v  Uganda unreported case no 
39/2003 ( 1 November 2005).  
22  Page 5 of the judgment. 
23  Pages 6, 10 of the judgment. See section 24 of the Evidence Act Cap 100 laws of Uganda and 
Festo Androa Assenua and Others v Uganda Unreported case no 1/ 1998, (2  October 1998). 
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deceptive law enforcement techniques.24 Unlike other jurisdictions like South Africa, where 
entrapments are within specified guidelines,25 it is not the case in Uganda. Police often 
goes beyond providing an opportunity for commission of an offence. Instances of malice in 
the use of entrapments lack clear yardsticks. In Cheptuke,26 where the appellant was 
challenging the conviction of corruptly soliciting a bribe, the Court noted existence of a 
poor relationship and the existence of malice    between the person laying the trap and the 
appellant. It did not however, delve into that issue.  In Uganda v Muwonge Emmanuel,27 a 
case with a similar charge, the Court used the existence of malice on the part of the 
police, to discredit the evidence.  
 
5.4 SEARCHES 
There is a practice of admitting evidence on search certificates, procured by police in the 
course of collecting evidence. Although the Constitution provides for a right to privacy,28 
the right has limitations, which may justify an intrusion into an individual’s privacy. The 
section provides that   
‘No person shall be subjected to — 
(a) unlawful search of the person, home or other property of that person; or 
(b) unlawful entry by others of the premises of that person’.29 
 
                                                          
24  Narnia B. Lead us not into temptation; the criminal liability of the trappe revisited; (1999) 12 
SAJCJ 317 317. 
25  Section 252A of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. 
26  Uganda v Cheptuke, Unreported case no 121/2010 (11 November 2010) page 3. 
27  Unreported case no 738/2009 (3 September 2009). 
28  Article 27. 
29  Article 27. 
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So where a search is lawful, it justifies a violation of the right as a limitation. The Police 
Act30 allows a police officer at or above the level of a Sergeant to conduct a search if he 
has reason to suspect that anything for the purposes of an investigation into any offence 
which he or she is authorised to investigate may be found in the place he wishes to 
search.31 It must be noted the officer should be in possession of a search warrant issued 
by a Magistrates’ Court, notwithstanding whether an arrest has been made or not.32 
The impropriety arises where the police officer gives wrong information to the court for 
purposes of obtaining the search warrant,33 or where the conduct of preparing the search 
warrant involves forcing persons who are not present at the search to append their names 
and signatures.34 There is inconsistency in dealing with evidence as a result of these 
search warrants. The courts always admit search warrants if the procedural grounds are 
met.35 In some cases, where witnesses are forced to sign search certificates, the courts 
have not admitted them, usually if the impropriety is coupled with a violation of human 
rights. In Uganda v Ekungu Simon,36 the accused person’s officemates were ordered by 
the arresting officers to sign search certificates as witnesses yet they were not in the room 
when the money was found.37 The court stated that the mode of arrest and the 
requirements for search certificates needed to be re-examined.38 
                                                          
30  Cap laws of Uganda. 
31  Section 27. 
32  Section 69 Magistrate Courts Act, Cap 16 Laws of Uganda. See section 27 Police Act. 
33  See The Regulation of Interception of Communications Act 18 of 2010, Sections 7(a)-(c).  
34  Ekungu generally. 
35  See Akbar Godi v Uganda Unreported case no 62/2011 (26 July 2013), Uganda v Kato Kajubi 
Unreported case no 28/2012 (26 July 2012).  
36  Ekungu page 10 
37  Page 9 
38  Page 9 
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5.5 CONDUCT OF IDENTIFICATION PARADES 
The courts are reluctant to expunge the evidence of identification parades if it is 
established that the accused did not complain or cross examine on the impropriety of the 
parade. In Sentale v Uganda,39 the court held that the main guidelines required in 
conducting identification parades include, informing the accused of the right to counsel, 
the officer in charge of the case not conducting the parade, and no witnesses seeing the 
accused before the parade takes place. In addition, the accused person is supposed to be 
placed among, at least eight persons, as far as possible of similar age, height, general 
appearance and class of life as the accused, and the accused may take any position he 
wishes. It is mandatory to inform an accused of the right to counsel before conducting an 
identification parade is mandatory and failure to do so is fatal to the parade.40 The 
situation should be distinguished from a scenario where an accused is informed of his 
right to counsel to be present at the identification parade and he says he has no 
advocate.41 He cannot turn around to say that the evidence obtained at the parade is 
improper, because he made the decision to take part in the parade after being informed of 
his right to counsel. 
 
In Kurong Stanley v Uganda,42 the accused objected to the admissibility of the evidence of 
the identification parade on grounds that he was not informed of his right to have counsel 
present, and that the identifying witnesses were shown the accused before the exercise 
began.43 Other grounds were that the accused was not placed on a parade with people of 
similar appearance, and that his presence among the nine people taking part in the 
                                                          
39  [1968] E.A. 365. 
40  Ssesanga Stephen vs Uganda Unreported case no 85/2000 in Kurong page 5. 
41  Ambaa Jacob and Asiku Jamil v Uganda unreported case no 10/2009 (16 May 2012) page  
42 Unreported case no 314 OF 2003 (13 June 2003) 
43 Page 3. 
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identification parade, was suggested to the witnesses by the police.44 In evaluating the 
evidence, the court found the grounds were not substantiated and that the minor 
irregularities in the exercise did not prejudice the fairness of the identification parade.45  
This case illustrates that exercise of discretion by courts embraces improperly obtained 
evidence if in their view, the irregularities are minor.  
 
In Ambaa Jacob and Asiku Jamil v Uganda,46 the accused objected to identification 
parade evidence on grounds that the accused being 19 years old was placed in a group of 
person with a big variance in age difference of 29, 36, 45, 32, 34, 55, 20, 24, 22, 23, 23, 
28, and 40 respectively. In addition, the accused, a butcher, was placed among police 
officers who were from a different standing in life. He argued that this greatly prejudiced 
the fairness of the identification parade.47 The Court stated that although the lower court 
did not comment on the organization of the parade, it evaluated the evidence properly.48 
Since the accused did not cross examine the police officer who organized the parade nor 
object to the presence of the persons who took part in the parade and the tendering of the 
police recordings of the parade; the Court found the conduct of the parade to be valid 
exercise and the identification of the first appellant at the parade was accurate.49 
 
  
                                                          
44 Page 3. 
45 Page 10. 
46 Unreported case no 10/2009 (16 May 2012) page 3. 
47 Pages 3-4. See Njiru and others Vs Republic [2002] 1 EA 218 (CAK). 
48 Page 4. 
49 Page 5. 
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5.6 INCULPATORY STATEMENTS 
There are instances where the accused inculpatory statements, which point to his guilt. 
Inculpatory statements may be used to corroborate the guilt of the accused. The general 
rule was laid in Musoke v R,50 where the Court held that it is also necessary before 
drawing the inference of the accused’s guilt from circumstantial evidence to be sure that 
there are no other co-existing circumstances which would weaken or destroy the 
inference. This is an indication that inculpatory statements should be subjected to other 
pieces of evidence before court relies on them to make a decision. So if the inculpatory 
statement is inconsistent with the innocence of the accused, and there is circumstantial 
evidence to point to the guilt of the accused, the statement will be admitted.  They may be 
used to place an inference of guilt and court may admit that evidence.  
 
5.6 CONCLUSION 
It is significant to note that the courts use corroboration, other independent evidence and 
human rights violations, to decide whether to admit improperly obtained evidence. Where 
there is no human rights violation, the courts may admit the evidence. Where there is 
corroboration or independent evidence to support the existence of improperly obtained 
evidence, this evidence may be admitted. Where corroboration, independent evidence 
and human right violations are lacking or weak, the courts’ admission of improperly 
obtained evidence revolves degree of impropriety. If the impropriety is high, the courts use 
the test of injustice occasioned to the accused. If it is affirmatively resolved that there is no 
injustice, the evidence is admitted.  
The trend by courts shows an exercise of discretion, if the admission of the improperly 
obtained evidence would lead to an unfair trial on an accused. Other than confessions, the 
researcher is not aware of any case, where a court has in its discretion, subjected 
                                                          
50  [1958] EA 715. See also Teper v R [1952] AC 480, Mwathi v R [2007] 2 EA 334, 227. 
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admissibility of evidence to a trial-within-a-trial. There is need therefore to provide 
recommendations which will aid the courts and relevant stakeholders, to deal with 
improperly or illegally obtained evidence. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.1 GENERAL CONCLUSION 
The African Commission has enhanced its jurisprudence on evidence obtained through 
human rights violations by passing the Principles and guidelines on the right to a fair trial 
and legal assistance in Africa1 and the Robben Island Guidelines.2 These principles and 
guidelines have been used in some of its communications. The ECtHR has used its 
communications to develop principles to guide the admissibility of evidence obtained 
through human rights violations. Although it is reluctant to evaluate admissibility of 
evidence, it requires that evidence that is unfair to the trial of an accused person should 
not be admitted. Its jurisprudence has raised question on the non- admission of evidence 
in instances where absolute rights like the rights against torture, cruel, inhuman and 
degrading treatment are violated. It has greatly enhanced the right against self-
incrimination as a yardstick for the fairness of a trial.  
While the CAT has a provision on non-admissibility of evidence obtained through torture, 
its application relates to cases of torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. The 
HRC is reluctant to evaluate admissibility of evidence unless  there is an arbitrary denial of 
justice to the complainant. The decisions of these international monitoring bodies lack an 
enforcement mechanism and their success depends on the co-operation of the state 
parties. 
While South Africa, Kenya and Zimbabwe have provisions in their constitutions that allow 
for a mode of dealing with evidence obtained through human rights violations, Hong Kong 
has developed consistent case law to deal with this evidence.  These principles operate 
                                                          
1 DOC/OS(XXX)247. 
2 Adopted by the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights at its 32nd Ordinary Seesion, 
on 17 to 23 October 2002. 
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alongside the common law exclusionary rules. Application of the developed principles play 
a triple role of using reliable evidence, while at the same time deterring the perpetrators of 
evidence obtained through human rights violations and protecting the accused from 
suffering a disadvantage from the admission of this evidence.  
 
In Uganda, it has been established that the Constitution is silent on evidence obtained 
through human rights violations. An evaluation of various pieces of legislation reveals that 
they do not adequately deal with this evidence. The only legislation which deals with 
evidence obtained through human rights violations is the Prevention and Prohibition of 
Torture Act, which is limited to evidence obtained through torture, cruel, inhuman and 
degrading treatment.  
 
The courts’ approach to evidence obtained through human rights violations is inconsistent 
in providing guidelines to follow that may stand the test of time. The courts look at 
corroboration, other independent evidence and human rights violations, to decide whether 
to admit the evidence.  The admission of improperly obtained evidence depends on the  
balancing of the degree of impropriety and potential injustice to be occasioned to the 
accused. The courts also rely on exercise of discretion which greatly leans to the reliability 
principle in admitting this evidence.  
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6.2 RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.2.1 AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION 
The Constitution should be amended to provide for a directive on how to deal with 
evidence obtained through human rights violations. The amendment should at least 
provide for a dual test of unfairness to the trial and administration of justice. The test of 
public opinion, may conflict with the administration of justice.  The amendment may be 
placed as a clause under Article 50 of the Constitution, which provides for a right of 
redress. The principles of causal link, standing, evidence procured by third parties should 
be left to the courts to develop as the amendment is applied. The amendment should have 
clarity to compel the exclusion of all illegal or improper evidence in form of information, 
statement and confessions.  
Chapter eight to the Constitution, provides for the Courts of Judicature. The courts of 
record in Uganda’s legal system should be empowered to develop common law in 
instances where there is an apparent problem with the law, which cannot be solved. Apart 
from confessions, one of the problems exacerbating the admission of evidence obtained 
through human rights violations is lack of a law to subject this evidence to a trial-within-a-
trial to establish whether it was obtained voluntarily. The courts’ ability to develop common 
law, will enable them to subject all issues of admissibility of evidence, to a trial-within-a-
trial. 
6.2.2 ENACTMENT AND AMENDMENT OF LEGISLATION 
Enactment of new legislation should reflect the international and regional practices. The 
principles emanating from the jurisprudence of the African Commission should be 
reflected in Uganda’s legislation. There should be an enactment of a Directorate of Public 
Prosecutions Act, to provide for the duties of a prosecutor to the accused, the victim and 
the court in instances where evidence is obtained through human rights violations. These 
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duties should include, first, the duty not to use evidence obtained through coercion,  
torture, inhuman or degrading treatment. Secondly the duty to bring to the attention of 
Court evidence that has been obtained through human and degrading treatment. Thirdly, 
duty to prosecute the perpetrators of such evidence and have the same admitted against 
them in courts of laws.  
While the principles and guidelines on the right to a fair trial are applicable in Uganda, as a 
State Party to the African Charter, they are not reflected in any criminal procedural laws. 
This diminishes chances of being used by conventional judicial officers who follow the law 
as it is written.  
The Police should be compelled to stop using procedures that taint the voluntariness of 
accused and other individuals who offer evidence to it. For instance, forcing persons to 
sign search certificates, yet they are not present during the search should be discouraged. 
Many cases, arising from Magistrates Courts, which are unfortunately, not courts of 
record, receive a lot of cases of this nature. The procedure from arrest to production of a 
person in Court for plea should be streamlined to avoid human rights violations.  
Amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code Act should provide for the bounds of using 
entrapments to acquire evidence. These bounds should include a clear definition by the 
Director of Public Prosecutions, of the persons, individuals or entities who may use traps. 
Secondly the conduct of the person using the trap to get evidence should not go beyond 
providing an opportunity to commit an offence. This shall help to place guidelines on what 
it means to go beyond an opportunity to commit an offence and enhance professionalism 
in investigations, while at the same time upholding human rights in the process. The 
Police Act, Criminal Procedure Act may also be amended to provide for duties on the 
investigators in the course of gathering evidence. This legislation will play a great role in 
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preventing human rights violations and procedural irregularities in the process of collecting 
evidence. 
 
6.2.3 JUDICIAL ADOPTION TO HUMAN RIGHTS RELEVANCE 
The Courts should be dynamic in the making of decisions which enhance the 
jurisprudence of evidence obtained through human rights violations. The decisions made 
should reflect the need to uphold human rights as the first priority. The procedural aspects 
of the chain of investigations should be used to enhance a fair trial.  There is a heavy 
reliance on the reliability theory of evidence. A shift to use the deterrent and protective 
theories should also be used.  This will deter the police from human rights violations and 
protect accused persons from suffering from unfair advantage due to the conduct of the 
police.  
The burden of proof should be on the prosecution to prove that evidence was obtained 
without violation of any rights of the accused. This will serve to protect the integrity of the 
criminal justice system by ensuring the presumption of innocence, principle of legality, 
protection of the right against self- incrimination and the  right to remain silent. 
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